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In the leading chapter of this dissertation, “Unemployment, Vulnerability and
Poverty: A New Class of Measures, Its Axiomatic Properties and Applications,”
we, Kaushik Basu and myself, derive a new class of measures for unemployment
or poverty. Measures of unemployment and poverty have usually focused solely
on those currently unemployed or below the poverty line, ignoring those who are
vulnerable to becoming unemployed or falling into poverty. We fully characterize a
class of measures that, unlike the standard measures of unemployment or poverty,
account for the amount of vulnerability that exists in a society and apply those
measures to the USA and South Africa.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, “Unemployment and Family-Values,”
I propose a new class of unemployment measures that incorporates the externalities
one receives from living in a household with employed individuals. The standard
measure of unemployment does not do this. A household with at least one em-
ployed person is more likely to have heating, water, and other household public
goods than a household where everyone is unemployed. Given this, I axiomatize
a class of unemployment measures that is sensitive to household unemployment
levels. This is done by assuming that if unemployment is held constant, say atﬁfty percent, an economy where half of each household is employed is better than
an economy where half of the households are fully unemployed and half are fully
employed.
The third chapter of this dissertation, “Racial Identity, Performance and Self-
Conﬁdence: A South African Experiment,” deals with the eﬀects of racial identity
in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Racial gaps across many measures of performance
are well documented. Whether these gaps occur because of discrimination or
are due to ex-ante diﬀerences between racial groups is still unanswered. Using
experimental data from Cape Town, we, Erica Field and myself, examine how
diﬀerent environments and incentive schemes eﬀect a student’s performance and
her level of self-conﬁdence. We ﬁnd that cuing a student to her racial identity
has a signiﬁcant aﬀect on performance, self-conﬁdence and where a student places
herself within a distribution. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant even if
the groups are ex-ante similar.Biographical Sketch
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xiiChapter 1
Unemployment, Vulnerability and
Poverty
A New Class of Measures, Its Axiomatic Proper-
ties and Applications1
1.1 Introduction
Traditional measures of unemployment or poverty were concerned with the total
number of people unemployed or living in poverty. In recent years such measures
have come under criticism for ignoring those who may not currently be poor or
unemployed but are vulnerable, that is, they live under the risk of becoming un-
employed or poor (see Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Cunningham and Maloney, 2000;
Thorbecke, 2003). And alongside this criticism a small but rapidly growing litera-
ture is emerging that looks at various aspects of vulnerability and tries to measure
1 This work is co-authored with Kaushik Basu.
1it (Ligon and Schechter, 2003; Pritchett, Suryahadi, and Sumarto, 2000; Amin,
Rai, and Topa, 1999).2
There is a presumption in much of this literature and the policy statements
of international organizations and governments that since vulnerability is bad,
we should craft policy to rescue people from being vulnerable. We argue in this
paper that such a prescription is wrong, or, at best, misleading. Under a variety of
‘normal’ situations, having some people vulnerable to unemployment or to poverty
make the aggregate problem of unemployment or poverty less severe (and more
bearable).
The aim of this paper is to explain this normative stance of ours, to develop
measures of unemployment and poverty that take account of this stance and then
to apply it to U.S. and South African data.
The explanation of our normative position is not complicated and the gen-
eral point can be made simply enough. Let us start by considering the case of
unemployment. Suppose there is a society in which, currently, some people are
unemployed and some people are vulnerable to unemployment (that is, there is a
probability that they will become unemployed in the next period). The presump-
tion in much of the literature and in many World Bank policy discussions (see,
for instance, World Bank, 2002) is that the standard measure of unemployment,
which ignores the vulnerable, eﬀectively underestimates the aggregate pain of un-
employment (including the pain of its anticipation) in society. We, on the other
hand, will argue that the standard measure of unemployment underestimates, not
2An important precursor of this literature is a body of writing that oc-
cured around the theme of income mobility: see, for instance, Shorrocks (1978),
Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Fields and Ok (1996).
2the pain, but the inequity of the pain of unemployment. Our argument is this
– if unemployment holds constant over time and there are, currently, some peo-
ple vulnerable to unemployment, then there must be some currently unemployed
people who have a positive probability of becoming employed in the next period.
If this is so, then an aggregate (that is, an economy-wide) measure of eﬀective
unemployment, while taking account of the pain of those who live under the risk
of unemployment, must also take account of the hope of the currently unemployed
who expect to ﬁnd jobs soon. We will argue presently that in an overall measure
of unemployment there is reason to treat the latter as more than oﬀsetting the
former. We should clarify that, contrary to the impression that the above sen-
tences might create, we do not take a welfarist approach in this paper but use the
above argument concerning the pain of living under the risk of unemployment as
motivation for creating distribution-sensitive measures of unemployment.
Consider the point some would make, that we are not right to assume that
just because there are some people who are vulnerable to unemployment, there
must be people currently unemployed but who have the probability of ﬁnding jobs
in the next period. Our response to this is that if there were no such people,
then having people who are vulnerable to unemployment is equivalent to saying
that unemployment will rise tomorrow. If we then treat the situation as worse
than what the standard measure captures, this does not show our valuation of
vulnerability but the fact that the absolute amount of unemployment is about to
rise. To isolate our attitude to vulnerability, we must consider a case where the
vulnerable population rises but the total number unemployed remains unchanged.
But this compels us to assume that a vulnerable population will be matched by a
3population expecting a converse shift - out of unemployment.
To close the argument consider two societies, x and y, in which unemployment
is the same, say 10%, and this remains constant over time. However, in society
x no one is vulnerable to unemployment, while in y, 10% are vulnerable, that is
they are currently employed but face a risk of unemployment. In other words,
the total amount of the burden of unemployment to be shared in both societies
is the same (10% of the people will have to be unemployed) but in y this burden
is shared by 20% of the population, while in x this is borne entirely by only 10%
of the population. The same way that, ceteris paribus (to use a term rapidly
going into extinction), greater equality in the distribution of income and wealth
(‘good things’, that is) is valued positively in most societies, we feel that there is
reason to prefer a society where the ‘bads’, such as unemployment and poverty, are
more equally distributed. It follows that, starting with society x, if vulnerability
is increased and we reach society y, then we must consider this a change for the
better. Therefore, the eﬀective unemployment must be considered to be less in
society y than in x.3 The next section formalizes the above idea by suggesting a
new measure of eﬀective unemployment.
3Another case for better sharing of ‘unemployment’ can be made by arguing
that, within each household, the unemployed are helped by the employed. In such
a situation there arises a natural case for a better distribution of unemployment
across households, as was argued in Basu and Foster (1998) in the context of
literacy.
41.2 A New Measure of Eﬀective Unemployment
Consider a society with n persons. Let ri be the fraction of a year during which
person i is unemployed. Hence, by the measure of the “standard unemployment
rate” this society’s unemployment is
U ≡
r1 + r2 + ... + rn
n
(1.1)
The standard unemployment measure that one encounters in newspapers is usually
the above measure (often multiplied by 100, since the measure is generally stated
in percentage terms).
From the discussion in the previous section it should be evident that we are
looking for a measure of unemployment (MOU) which is distribution sensitive.
That is, if the same aggregate unemployment is unevenly shared in one society,
we shall consider the eﬀective unemployment to be greater in the more unequal
society. We codify this later, in Axiom E, as the “equity axiom.”
Let us deﬁne an unemployment proﬁle of a society to be a vector (r1,r2,...,rn)
such that, for all i, ri ∈ [0,1]. Let ∆ be the collection of all unemployment
proﬁles. Hence, ∆ = {(r1,r2,...,rn)| n ∈ Z++ and ri ∈ [0,1], ∀i} where Z++ is
the set of strictly positive integers.
Formally, a measure of unemployment (hereafter referred to as MOU) is a
function
M : ∆ → R+
where R+ is the set of non-negative real numbers.
The MOU that we propose in this paper, takes the following form:
5M
β (r1,...,rn) ≡
1
β
−
n Y
i=1
(
1
β
− ri)
1
n (1.2)
where β ∈ (0,1)
Since for every β ∈ (0,1) we have a distinct measure Mβ, what we have
just proposed is a class of new measures of unemployment. We shall show that
these measures have appealing properties, demonstrate, with some actual empirical
examples, how using these new measures make a diﬀerence to the description of
unemployment and then fully characterize these measures. Let us from now on
call an MOU deﬁned by (2), above, an eﬀective unemployment rate.
One property of every member of the family of eﬀective unemployment rates
worth observing at the outset is that if R = (r1,r2,...,rn) is such that ri = r, ∀i,
then Mβ (R) = r. In other words, if the burden of unemployment is perfectly eq-
uitably shared by everybody then the eﬀective unemployment rate is independent
of β ∈ (0,1) and equal to the standard unemployment rate deﬁned in (1).
It is worth checking what the limits or boundaries of our class of measures look
like. First consider the case where β = 1. This measure (which is not a part of the
class we are recommending) is represented by: M1(r1,r2,...,rn) = 1−
n Y
i=1
(1 − ri)
1
n.
Note that if for some i, ri = 1, i.e. one person is fully unemployed, then M1 = 1.
Hence, this measure makes no diﬀerence between the cases where 1 person is
fully unemployed and where 10 persons are fully unemployed. It amounts to a
Rawlsian-type evaluation where a tragedy for one is a tragedy for all.
Now, what about the other limit, that is as β goes to 0? It can be shown
that as β → 0, Mβ → U. That is as β goes to 0, our measure converges to the
standard unemployment rate as deﬁned by (1). The ﬁrst lemma establishes this
6result. Since the standard measure is one in which individual unemployments are
aggregated by simply adding up, this could be thought of as a kind of utilitarian
representation of unemployment. Hence the class of measures that we are propos-
ing is bounded at one end by a Rawlsian-type representation and at the other end
by a utilitarian one.
Lemma 1 For all R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆, and for all β ∈ (0,1), lim
β→0
Mβ(R) =
Pn
i=1 ri
n
Proof.
lim
β→0
M
β (R) = lim
β→0
{
1
β
−
n Y
i=1
(
1
β
− ri)
1
n}
= lim
β→0
{
1
β
[1 −
n Y
i=1
(β)
1
n (
1
β
− ri)
1
n]}
= lim
β→0
{
1
β
[1 −
n Y
i=1
(1 − βri)
1
n]}
= lim
β→0
{
[1 −
Qn
i=1(1 − βri)
1
n]
β
} =
0
0
So we may now use L’Hˆ opital’s Rule. Note that
∂
∂β
β = 1,
and
∂
∂β
[1 −
n Y
i=1
(1 − βri)
1
n] = −
n X
k=1

1
n

(1 − βrk)
1−n
n (−rk)(
Y
i6=k
(1 − βri)
1
n)
Taking the limit of this numerator we get
lim
β→0
{−
n X
k=1

1
n

(1 − βrk)
1−n
n (−rk)(
Y
i6=k
(1 − βri)
1
n)} = −
n X
k=1

1
n

(−rk)
=
1
n
n X
k=1
rk
7Thus by L’Hˆ opital’s Rule
lim
β→0
{
[1 −
Qn
i=1(1 − βri)
1
n]
β
} =
1
n
n X
k=1
rk
Which implies that
lim
β→0
M
β (R) =
1
n
n X
k=1
rk
We shall now demonstrate how the eﬀective unemployment rate, as character-
ized by (2), satisﬁes some attractive axioms. Consider ﬁrst two routine axioms.
Axiom O (Monotonicity Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy the mono-
tonicity axiom if for any R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆ and R0 = (r0
1,r0
2,...,r0
n) ∈ ∆ such
that, ∀i, ri ≥ r0
i and ∃ j where rj > r0
j, then M(R) > M(R0).
Axiom P (Population Replication Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy
the population replication axiom if for any R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆ and Rk =
(r0
1,r0
2,...,r0
kn) ∈ ∆, where Rk is a k-replica of R for some positive integer k (that
is r0
j = ri, ∀j ∈ {1 + (i − 1)k,...,ik}, ∀i ∈ {1,...,n}), then M (R) = M
 
Rk
.
These two axioms are standard and we would expect a good measure to satisfy
them. Fortunately – as is easy to see – the eﬀective unemployment rate that we
have proposed satisﬁes both these axioms. Observe that, given the Monotonicity
axiom, coupled with the fact that Mβ(1,1,...,1) = 1, we now know that our
measure ranges from 0 to 1. That is, Mβ(∆) ⊂ [0,1].
Our measure, and the need to break away from the standard unemployment
concept, was motivated by using an equity argument, namely, that it is superior to
have a society where the burden of a certain amount of aggregate unemployment is
8more widely shared. So it is important to check that the eﬀective unemployment
rate satisﬁes equity. The simplest idea of equity may be formalized as follows.
Axiom E (Equity Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy the equity axiom
if for R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆ and R∗ = (r∗,r∗,...,r∗) ∈ ∆ such that
Pn
i=1 ri = nr∗
and R 6= R∗, then M (R) > M (R∗).
It can be shown that Mβ satisﬁes the equity axiom for every β ∈ (0,1). But
instead of showing this directly, we will show that Mβ satisﬁes another axiom and
then show that the latter implies the equity axiom. This other axiom is the ‘trans-
fer axiom’ widely used in the literature on poverty and inequality measurement
(Sen 1976). This, in the context of unemployment, says the following. Suppose
there are two people, one who is unemployed more than the other. Now if the
more unemployed person becomes even more unemployed – say by ε amount of
time – and the less unemployed person ﬁnds more work – again by ε amount of
time – then the eﬀective unemployment is higher. Formally,
Axiom T (Transfer Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy the transfer
axiom if for any R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆ and R0 = (r0
1,r0
2,...,r0
n) ∈ ∆ such that
rk = r0
k ∀k 6= i,j, ri ≥ rj and r0
i = ri + ε ≤ 1 and r0
j = rj − ε ≥ 0 (for some ε
> 0), then M(R0) > M(R).
Lemma 2 For all R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆, and for all β ∈ (0,1) every eﬀective
unemployment rate, Mβ, satisﬁes the transfer axiom.
Proof. Mβ (R0) = 1
β −
n Y
k=1
( 1
β − r0
k)
1
n
= 1
β − ( 1
β − r0
i)
1
n( 1
β − r0
j)
1
n
n Y
k6=i,j
( 1
β − r0
k)
1
n
9= 1
β − [( 1
β − ri − )( 1
β − rj + )]
1
n
n Y
k6=i,j
( 1
β − rk)
1
n
= 1
β − [

1
β − ri

1
β − rj

− (ri − rj)ε − ε2]
1
n
n Y
k6=i,j
( 1
β − rk)
1
n
> 1
β − [

1
β − ri

1
β − rj

]
n Y
k6=i,j
( 1
β − rk)
1
n, since ri ≥ rj, ε > 0 and β ∈ (0,1)
= 1
β −
n Y
i=1
( 1
β − ri)
1
n = Mβ (R)
The fact that Mβ satisﬁes the equity axiom follows from Lemma 2 and the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 If an MOU satisﬁes the transfer axiom, it must satisfy the equity axiom.
Proof. Suppose M is an MOU that satisﬁes the transfer axiom.
Consider, e R = (r1,r2,.... ,rn) and R∗ = (r∗,r∗,.... ,r∗) which satisfy the hy-
potheses of the equity axiom. That is e R,R∗ ∈ ∆, e R 6= R∗ and
Pn
i=1 ri = nr∗
Deﬁne S ⊂ ∆ such that S ≡ {R = (r1,r2,.... ,rn) ∈ ∆ |
Pn
i=1 ri = nr∗}.
Note that for any R 6= R∗, R = (r1,r2,... ,rn) ∈ S\{R∗}
So we can deﬁne r(R) ≡ max
i
ri and r(R) ≡ min
i
ri.
Let ε = min{r(R) − r∗,r∗ − r(R)}
Now deﬁne a mapping Ψ : S → S, as follows:
Ψ(R∗) = R∗or, if R = (r1,r2,....,rn) 6= R∗, then Ψ(R) = R0
where R0 = (r0
1,r0
2,... ,r0
n) such that r0
k = rk, ∀rk 6= r(R),r(R),
and r0
i = r(R) + ε for ri = r(R)
and r0
j = r(R) − ε for rj = r(R)
By the transfer axiom we know that M(R) > M(Ψ(R)).
Now look at the inﬁnite sequence {R1,R2,..... }
10such that R1 = e R and Rt+1 = Ψ(Rt) ∀t > 1.
There must exist some t such that ∀t ≥ t, Rt = R∗.
Thus M (R1) > M (Rt), ∀t > 1, and therefore Mf (R) > M (R∗)
In the light of this result, the next lemma is obvious and stated only for com-
pleteness.
Lemma 4 Every eﬀective unemployment rate, Mβ, satisﬁes the Equity Axiom.
While the measure being suggested here has attractive axiomatic properties,
which particular β should one use when applying this measure? One possibility
is to study the sensitivity of ranking societies with respect to changes in β. The
other is to pick some salient values of β from the interval (0,1) and use those
speciﬁc measures. This is the strategy that is often used vis-a-vis the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke family of poverty measures (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984).
For such salient β’s an obvious one is the half-way mark, that is, β = 1
2. There
is another one, β = 8
9, which appears unnatural at ﬁrst sight, but has a natural
explanation.
Consider a society of size n and suppose that x is the fraction of society that has
to be unemployed. In other words, the total amount of jobs available is (1−x)n.
For matters of illustration we are ignoring the fact that (1 − x)n may not be an
integer. Let us ﬁx x and consider diﬀerent distributions of the total amount of
unemployment nx, and their corresponding measures of eﬀective unemployment.
By using the equity axiom it is clear that eﬀective unemployment is minimized if
nx is distributed equitably, that is, if each person is unemployed a fraction x of
her time.
11effective 
unemployment 
rate
1
.5
.5 1 0
 _ β
M (x)
m(x)
Figure 1.1
Relation of the usual and effective 
unemployment rate for a given β. 
usual unemployment
rate, x
Let m(x) be the minimum eﬀective unemployment rate for a society with a total
burden of unemployment nx. It is easy to see this is independent of β ∈ (0,1).
Hence, writing this as m(x), with no mention of β, is ﬁne. It is obvious that
m(x), will be a 45o–line as shown in Figure 1.1. Thus if half the society has to be
half unemployed (i.e. x = 1
2), the lowest value Mβ takes is when every person is
half-time unemployed. In that case, for all β ∈ (0,1), Mβ(x,... ,x) = 1
2.
Here is an interesting question. Let us pick any x ∈ [0,1] and think of the
worst distribution of this total burden of x unemployment (in the sense of the
distribution that makes eﬀective unemployment the maximum). By the Transfer
Axiom, we know that this happens when some people are fully unemployed and
the rest are fully employed. Hence, ﬁx β ∈ (0,1), consider this worst-distribution
for every x and deﬁne M
β
(x) as the value of Mβ for a (r1,r2,... ,rn) which is the
worst way to share the burden of nx. Clearly M
β
(x) ∈ (x,1),∀x. It is not hard
12to see that for a given β, M
β
(x) will look something like the curve shown in Figure
1.1. The higher the values of β, the higher the curve will be. And as β goes to
0, the line will converge to the m(x) curve.
There are two ways of choosing β. One is to elicit this from individual choice.
This involves asking individuals questions like: If you face a choice of two lotteries,
one in which you will be unemployed all year with the probability 1
4 or employed
for the full year with probability 3
4; and the other in which you will be employed
for a fraction t of the year with certainty and unemployed for the remainder of the
year, what value of t would you choose? This would be in the spirit of what Ligon
and Schechter (2003) do.
The other way to approach β is as a moral judgement of the policy maker. In
the absence of data on individual risk-aversion, let us explore that moral approach
here. Just to ﬁx our thinking consider the case of x = 1
2. We know that if every
person is unemployed 1
2 of the year then Mβ(1
2) = 1
2, ∀β. Now consider the worst
distribution of this total burden. Clearly this is one where n
2 persons are fully
employed and n
2 persons are fully unemployed. Let R = (r1,r2,..... ,rn) signify
such a distribution. We know that Mβ(R) ∈ (1
2,1) as β varies from 0 to 1. We
need to ask ourselves: what score we would like to give to Mβ(R)? One simple
strategy is to set this half-way in this interval. That is Mβ(R) = 3
4. In other
words we are making the judgement that a society where half the people are fully
employed and half are fully unemployed is equivalent to one where everybody is
employed with certainty for one quarter of the time. What would β have to be to
yield this mid-way result?
13The answer turns out to be, interestingly, 8
9. To see this note:
M
β (R) =
1
β
−

1
β
− 1
 1
n· n
2 
1
β
− 0
 1
n· n
2
=
1
β
−

1
β
− 1
 1
2 
1
β
 1
2
=
1
β
−
(1 − β)
1
2
β
If Mβ(R) = 3
4, it follows that β = 8
9. Hence, the 8
9 rule. We shall use in the
empirical section, as one of the salient values.
1.3 Simple Data Exercise
To provide an illustrative example of how our measure works we require certain in-
formation. Firstly, a history of how much someone was unemployed over a certain
period of time. For this exercise we will use the weeks or months one was unem-
ployed over a year. Second, we require a value for the parameter β. As explained
earlier, for the purpose of illustration, we will use the values β = 1
2 and β = 8
9.
The March Current Population Surveys (hereafter referred to as the CPS) for
the United States have the amount of weeks any member of the workforce was
employed during the previous year. The Labour Force Surveys (hereafter referred
to as LFS) for South Africa have the amount of months that one was unemployed
during the previous year, if she was unemployed at the time of the survey, and
when one started a job, if she is currently working at the time of the survey.
Using these data the diﬀerences of the eﬀective and the standard measures of
unemployment can be illustrated. In the South African case one will have to
14make some assumptions to go from the available statistics to the numbers we
need.
1.3.1 United States
We will begin with the case of the United States. The CPS contains how many
weeks a survey participant had been employed during the previous year. There-
fore, since we have the data for the March CPS from 1976 through 2003, we are
able to calculate the usual yearly unemployment rate and the eﬀective yearly un-
employment rate for the years of 1975 through 2002 (excluding 1993 because of
data issues).
To get measures of unemployment as accurate as possible we tried to exclude
students and retired individuals by calculating the unemployment rates only for
people between the ages of 25 and 54. Any persons who listed themselves as being
unemployed for any of the following reasons were dropped from the survey even
if they were between the ages of 25 and 54: to take care of house or family; ill
or disabled; to attend school; and retired. Thus we were left only with people
who were able to participate in the labor market during the full year and had
been actively seeking work – anyone who claimed to have not worked for the year,
but had spent less than four weeks searching for a job was not included in our
calculations.
Table 1.1 shows the usual unemployment rate and the eﬀective unemployment
rates for β = 1
2 and β = 8
9 over the years for which we have data. Figure 1.2 puts
this information into graphical form. To begin our discussion it is useful to focus
attention on three sets of years: 1987-1989; 1991-1992; and 1999-2000. These three
15Year
Usual Unemployment 
Rate
Effective Unemploymnet 
Rate at β=(1/2)
Effective Unemployment 
Rate at β=(8/9)
2002 0.0529 0.0624 0.0803
2001 0.0457 0.0533 0.0669
2000 0.0382 0.0442 0.0544
1999 0.0382 0.0443 0.0547
1998 0.0490 0.0572 0.0721
1997 0.0431 0.0502 0.0630
1996 0.0530 0.0619 0.0782
1995 0.0585 0.0686 0.0874
1994 0.0612 0.0719 0.0922
1993 -- -- --
1992 0.0707 0.0834 0.1079
1991 0.0705 0.0822 0.1039
1990 0.0602 0.0697 0.0864
1989 0.0529 0.0613 0.0761
1988 0.0543 0.0633 0.0797
1987 0.0537 0.0632 0.0819
1986 0.0621 0.0734 0.0958
1985 0.0639 0.0756 0.0987
1984 0.0677 0.0807 0.1071
1983 0.0829 0.0994 0.1341
1982 0.0916 0.1092 0.1455
1981 0.0680 0.0800 0.1037
1980 0.0635 0.0744 0.0953
1979 0.0500 0.0579 0.0726
1978 0.0501 0.0583 0.0735
1977 0.0565 0.0663 0.0850
1976 0.0646 0.0763 0.0996
1975 0.0708 0.0836 0.1089
Table 1.1
Usual and Effective Unemployment Rates for the USA
Usual and effective unemployment rates for individuals that were in the labor force, aged 25 to 
54 and available for employment that entire year.  Please note that "--" implies the rates could 
not be calculated for that year.
16periods illustrate how even though the usual unemployment rate stayed roughly
constant our eﬀective unemployment measure showed diﬀerent trends occurring
in each period. The period from 1987 to 1989 has a continuous decrease in the
eﬀective unemployment rate at β = 8
9. During this period the usual unemployment
rate rose slightly from 1987 to 1988 and then back to slightly below the 1987
level in 1989. Thus while welfare judgements based on the usual unemployment
rank would place 1987, 1988 and 1989 as being roughly equivalent, if one takes
vulnerability into account – as we have deﬁned it – then 1989 would be ranked
unambiguously better than either of the other two years, and 1998 would be ranked
higher than 1987. The eﬀective measure at β = 1
2 shows the same trend but there
is almost no movement between 1986 and 1987. Therefore during the years of 1987
to 1989, under President Reagan’s administration, the burden of unemployment
became more equitably shared according to the eﬀective unemployment measure
with β = 8
9.
The period of 1991-1992, under President George Herbert Walker Bush’s ad-
ministration, our eﬀective unemployment measure tells a diﬀerent story. Again
during this period we have the usual unemployment rate staying roughly constant,
but by both the β = 8
9 and the β = 1
2 eﬀective unemployment measures the burden
of unemployment was being shared less equitably in 1992 than in 1991. In contrast
to these two examples, the period of 1999-2000, during Clinton’s administration,
shows that both the usual unemployment measure and the eﬀective unemployment
measures rank the years as being roughly equivalent. This shows that there was
no signiﬁcant change in the equity of how the unemployment burden was being
shared.
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18These example illustrate how our measure can be used to distinguish between
years that might seem to be roughly equivalent in regards to unemployment, and
shows how the role of vulnerability can cause a re-ranking of how one judges a
country’s well-being based on unemployment over the years. This illustration
uses only information from within one country. The eﬀective unemployment
measures can also be an excellent way to compare the unemployment situation
between countries.
1.3.2 South Africa
The South African LFS are twice yearly surveys that are representative of the
Republic of South Africa. The survey collects data on people who are currently
unemployed and those currently employed, but ﬁguring out the yearly history of
individuals is not as easy as with the CPS. Any person who is currently working
is asked when she began working at that job. Therefore we have a measure of
duration of her current employment. Likewise, anyone unemployed is asked how
long it has been since she last worked, if she had worked at all, giving us the
duration of the current unemployment spell.
In South Africa the labor unions are rather powerful and, because of the his-
torical situation, ﬁring an individual is rather hard. Therefore, job turnover is
a rarer phenomenon than in the United States. Thus, the duration periods are
probably an accurate measures of a labor force participant’s job status over the
past year. With this in mind the usual and eﬀective unemployment rates were
calculated in this ‘moderate’ case. The durations are by no means guaranteed to
be accurate representatives of the employment history, though, so we have also
19constructed bounds to the measures of unemployment.
To understand how these bounds were calculated let us look at a worker who
was employed for six months at the time of the survey. We know that she has
worked at least six months over the past year, and the employment pattern for
the other six months is lost. In the worst case scenario she spent the previous
six months searching for the one job she had at the time of the survey and was
unemployed the rest of the time. This means that her duration of current employ-
ment is the worst history she could have. On the other hand, since we know she
was only working at her current job for six months she could have found that job
after only one month or less of unemployment – she would be counted as having
had one month of unemployment even if it was less than that, though. Thus
her best unemployment proﬁle would be eleven months working and one month
unemployed.
Likewise a currently unemployed person has a best and worse case scenario. If
a person was unemployed for six months, then, in the best case, she was working
for the six months before that, in the worst case she was working for only one
month before her unemployment began. The usual and eﬀective unemployment
rates were therefore also calculated for both the ‘worst’ and ‘best’ case scenarios.
When comparing the usual unemployment rate under these three scenarios to
that listed as the oﬃcial unemployment rate by the LFS the moderate rate was
almost identical over all ﬁve periods.4 Therefore, in our discussion below we will
4The oﬃcial unemployment rate according to the LFS are 26.2, 25.4, 26, 29.2
and 29 percent while the usual unemployment rate calculated using the ‘moderate’
estimates of ri are 23, 23, 23.2, 28.5 and 31.7 for February 2000, September 2000,
February 2001, September 2001 and February 2002 respectively.
20use the results from the calculations done on the moderate data.
The usual and eﬀective unemployment rates for the ‘moderate’ case are de-
picted graphically in Figure 1.3. The eﬀective unemployment seems to be simply
a horizontal increase of the usual unemployment. This may be because of the
coarseness of the LFS data with respect to the CPS data or it may be because of
a lack of change in the equity of unemployment. Comparing this graph to that
of the United States, though, one can see that the jump from the usual measure
of unemployment to the eﬀective measures is much higher in both the β = 1
2 and
β = 8
9 case for South Africa than for the United States. The eﬀective unemploy-
ment rate at β = 1
2 on average 1.17 times the usual unemployment rate in the
US and never above 1.199 the usual rate. In South Africa, though, the eﬀective
unemployment rate at β = 1
2 is on average 1.25 times the usual unemployment rate
and never below 1.22 times the usual rate. Likewise at β = 8
9 the eﬀective un-
employment rate is on average 1.50 times and 1.83 times the usual unemployment
rate in the US and South Africa respectively.
One may ask: What does this proportional diﬀerence show? Since our eﬀective
unemployment measure adjusts for the inequity of unemployment in a society then
the higher jump from the usual to eﬀective rate in the case of South Africa suggests
that the burden of unemployment is shared less equitably in South Africa than in
the United States. Given South Africa’s history this is not a hard story to believe.
To make this claim in a more rigorous manner, and not just to provide illustration,
one would have to test the conﬁdence intervals of the proportions mentioned above.
Given the size of the samples in both the LFS and the CPS the discussion above
is probably not going to be contradicted. Furthermore, one could ask what is
21S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
n
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
0
0
.
1
0
.
2
0
.
3
0
.
4
0
.
5
0
.
6
D
e
c
 
1
9
9
9
M
a
r
 
2
0
0
0
J
u
n
 
2
0
0
0
O
c
t
 
2
0
0
0
J
a
n
 
2
0
0
1
A
p
r
 
2
0
0
1
J
u
l
 
2
0
0
1
N
o
v
 
2
0
0
1
F
e
b
 
2
0
0
2
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
2
M
o
n
t
h
s
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
R
a
t
e
U
s
u
a
l
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
R
a
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
ȕ
=
(
1
/
2
)
E
f
f
e
c
i
t
v
e
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
ȕ
=
(
8
/
9
)
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
.
3
T
h
e
 
u
s
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
 
s
e
n
a
r
i
o
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
o
f
 
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
0
0
,
 
2
0
0
1
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
2
 
a
n
d
 
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
0
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
1
.
22causing this diﬀerence in vulnerability levels. For example it may be that we
are only picking up frictional unemployment in the United States, but structual
unemployment in South Africa.
1.4 A Full Characterization of the Eﬀective Measure
After seeing the usefulness of this measure and its applicability it is worth returning
to the theoretical discussion and addressing a natural question. We have seen that
our measure of unemployment satisﬁes several attractive axioms, but is there a set
of axioms that exactly characterize our measure or, more precisely, the class of
measures we proposed and is stated in (2)? This is what we set out to answer in
this section.
A property that we have already discussed but needs to be stated formally is
codiﬁed in the next axiom.
Axiom C (Coincidence): A MOU, M, satisﬁes this axiom if
∀R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆, such that r1 = r2 = ... = rn ≡ r, M (R) = r.
This axiom says that if in some society everybody is unemployed to the same
extent as everybody else, then the society’s unemployment rate should be equal
to the individual’s unemployment rate. This is a normalization axiom which says
that if the distribution of unemployment is perfectly egalitarian then our measure
coincides with the standard unemployment rate.
Another axiom that we will use and seems eminently reasonable is the following.
23Axiom A (Anonymity): The MOU, M, satisﬁes anonymity if ∀R =
(r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆ and ∀ permutations σ : {1,...,n} → {1,...,n}, M (R) =
M
 
rσ(1),rσ(2),...,rσ(n)

.
And ﬁnally, a much stronger axiom.
Axiom R (Representation): For every individual i, ∃ a utility function
ui : [0,1] → R++,and ∀n ∈ Z++, ∃ an aggregation mapping F : Rn
++ → R, such
that, ∀R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ [0,1], M(R) = F (u1 (r1),u2 (r2),...,un (rn)) and
(i) ∀i, ui is aﬃne and decreasing,
(ii) F satisﬁes anonymity. That is ∀u = (u1,u2,...,un) ∈ Rn
++ and ∀ permu-
tations σ : {1,...,n} → {1,...,n}, then F (u1,u2,...,un) = F(uσ(1),uσ(2),...,uσ(n)).
And
(iii) F satisﬁes scale independence. That is F(u1,u2,...,un) ≥ F(u0
1,u0
2,...,u0
n)
and (b1,b2,...,bn) ∈ Rn
++ implies that F(b1u1,b2u2,...,bnun) ≥ F(b1u0
1,b2u0
2,...,bnu0
n).
If an MOU satisﬁes axiom R, we shall call each ui function and the F function
referred to in the axiom as person i’s utility function and the society’s aggregation
function, respectively. What Axiom R(iii) says is that a change in the unit for
measuring one person’s utility must be of no consequence in our social evaluation
of the economy.
Theorem 1: An MOU, M, satisﬁes axioms A, C, O and R if and only if it
belongs to the class described in (2). That is, ∀R ∈ (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆,
M (r)=
1
β
−
"
n Y
i=1

1
β
− ri
# 1
n
where β ∈ (0,1)
24Proof. (⇒) That the MOU described in (2) satisﬁes axioms O and C we have
already seen. Axiom A is obvious. To see that it satisﬁes axiom R, consider
ui = 1
β − ri, for all i, and deﬁne the welfare mapping F as follows:
F =
1
β
−
"
n Y
i=1
ui
# 1
n
(1.3)
It is easy to see that (3) satisﬁes axiom R.
(⇐) Next assume that M is an MOU that satisﬁes axioms A, C, O, and R. By
axiom R we know that ∃ a welfare mapping F such that, ∀R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆,
M(R) = F (u1 (r1),u2 (r2),...,un (rn)). Now the proof will continue in a series of
steps.
• Step 1: It will ﬁrst be shown that F is a transformation of the prod-
uct of the arguments. In other words, ∀ u = (u1,u2,...,un) ∈ Rn
++,
F(u) = φ

n Q
i=1
ui

. Consider a utility vector u = (u1,u2,...,un) ∈ Rn
++.
Then

u
1
n
1 ,u
1
n
2 ,...,u
1
n
n

∈ Rn
++.
Note F

u
1
n
1 ,u
1
n
2 ,...,u
1
n
n

= F

u
1
n
2 ,u
1
n
3 ,...,u
1
n
n,u
1
n
1

by axiom R(ii).
F

u
1
n
1 u
1
n
1 ,u
1
n
2 u
1
n
2 ,...,u
1
n
nu
1
n
n

= F

u
1
n
1 u
1
n
2 ,u
1
n
2 u
1
n
3 ,...,u
1
n
n−1u
1
n
n,u
1
n
nu
1
n
1

by axiom R(iii).
25F

u
2
n
1 ,u
2
n
2 ,...,u
2
n
n

= F

(u1u2)
1
n,(u2u3)
1
n,...,(un−1un)
1
n,(unu1)
1
n

= F

(u2u3)
1
n,(u3u4)
1
n,...,(unu1)
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Continuing in this manner we get
F

u
n
n
1 ,u
n
n
2 ,...,u
n
n
n

= F

(
Qn
i=1ui)
1
n ,(
Qn
i=1ui)
1
n ,...,(
Qn
i=1ui)
1
n

It follows that if u,v ∈ Rn
++ such that
Qn
i=1ui =
Qn
i=1vi, then F (u) = F (v).
Hence, ∃ a function φ, such that ∀ u ∈ Rn
++, F(u) = φ(
Qn
i=1ui).
• Step 2: Now it will be shown that F is a negative monotone transformation
of the product of the arguments. That is ∃ φ : R → [0,1] such that x,y ∈ R,
x > y implies φ(x) < φ(y). Let R, R0 ∈ ∆ be such that R = (r1,r2,...,rn)
and R0 = (r0
1,r0
2,...,r0
n) and r0
1 > r1. Then by axiom O, M(R0) > M (R).
Now, by axiom R, in particular that ui is a decreasing function for all i, we
know that u1 (r1)
Qn
i=2ui (ri) > u1 (r0
1)
Qn
i=2ui (ri). Furthermore, again by
axiom R, we know:
M (R) = F (u1 (r1),u2 (r2),...,un (rn)) = φ(u1 (r1)
Qn
i=2ui (ri))
M (R
0) = φ(u1 (r
0
1)
Qn
i=2ui (ri))
Since M(R0) > M (R), it follows that φ is a decreasing function.
26• Thus with these two steps we know that there exists a decreasing function φ
such that ∀R = (r1,r2,...,rn)
M(R) = φ(
Qn
i=1ui (ri)) (1.4)
• Step 3: Now it will be shown that there is no loss of generality by re-
quiring that every person’s utility function is identical. Consider R =
(r∗,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆. By axiom A, M (r∗,r2,...,rn) = M (r2,r∗,...,rn). Hence
(4) implies that
M (r
∗,r2,...,rn) = M (r2,r
∗,...,rn)
φ(u1 (r
∗)u2 (r2)
Qn
i=3ui (ri)) = φ(u1 (r2)u2 (r
∗)
Qn
i=3ui (ri))
and, since φ has been shown to be a decreasing function we have:
u1 (r
∗)u2 (r2)
Qn
i=3ui (ri) = u1 (r2)u2 (r
∗)
Qn
i=3ui (ri)
which implies u1 (r
∗)u2 (r2) = u1 (r2)u2 (r
∗)
u2 (r2) =
u1 (r2)u2 (r∗)
u1 (r∗)
Likewise, using the same argument as above we have that uj (rj) = u1(rj)
uj(r∗)
u1(r∗),
∀j = 1,...,n. Therefore, ∀(r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆,
Qn
i=1ui (ri) = θ
Qn
i=1ui (r∗)
where θ ≡
Qn
i=1ui(r∗)
u1(r∗)n > 0. It follows that if there is a decreasing func-
tion φ satisfying (4), there must exist a decreasing function Ψ, such that
∀R = (r1,r2,...,rn) ∈ ∆, M(R) = Ψ(
Qn
i=1u1 (ri)). For simplicity we will
write u(ri) for u1(ri) so we have
M(R) = Ψ(
Qn
i=1u(ri)) (1.5)
27• Step 4: We will now complete the proof. By axiom C, we know that ∀r ∈
[0,1], r = Ψ(u(ri)
n). If we write x ≡ u(ri)
n, then Ψ(x) = u−1

x
1
n

.
By axiom R(ii), we can write u(r) = A − Br, where B > 0. Hence,
Ψ(x) = A
B − x
1
n
B . Therefore, by using (5) we have
M(r1,r2,...,rn) =
A
B
−
1
B
[
Qn
i=1 (A − Bri)]
1
n
=
A
B
−

Qn
i=1

A
B
− ri
 1
n
By writing β for B
A, we have
M(r1,r2,...,rn) =
1
β
−

Qn
i=1

1
β
− ri
 1
n
Since u : [0,1] → R++, then u(1) = [A − B · 1] > 0 which implies A > B.
Therefore 1 > β. Since, in addition B > 0 (by axiom R(i)), then β > 0.
What we have left therefore is precisely the class of MOUs described in (2).
One advantage of a full axiomatization of the kind just undertaken is that it
helps us evaluate the measure by factorizing it to its constituents. In this case
the strong assumption is clearly axiom R. This requires individual utility to be
cardinal but does not impose interpersonal comparability. This kind of an axiom is
used to derive the Nash bargaining solution and is also widely used in social choice
theory (Sen 1974, 1977). What may appear more contentious is the requirement
that ui be aﬃne.
Some may treat this as reason to look for a diﬀerent measure of unemployment,
but there are two points worth keeping in mind. First, there are alternate ways
28of axiomatizing the same measure. So there may be other ways of visualizing our
measure that do not require one to use an aﬃne utility function as an input.
Secondly, we must not think of the utility function of each person, ui, as the
person’s own evaluation of her utility. Instead it should be viewed as society’s
evaluation of a person’s employment status, which may well be diﬀerent from the
person’s own utility evaluation (this is elaborated upon further in the next section).
Once we take this approach and note that there are two steps to getting to a ﬁnal
measure (i) the assessment of each person’s utility, ui, and (ii) aggregation of these
using a function, F, it becomes evident that the concavity of F acts as a substitute
for diminishing marginal utility of the individual and that is the route we are taking
here.
Moreover, our approach has some natural interpretational advantages. Con-
sider person i’s utility function: ui = A − Bri. Let ∆ui be the change in this
person’s utility if her status changed from fully unemployed (ri = 1) to fully em-
ployed (ri = 0). Clearly ∆ui = B. Now let e ui be this person’s reservation utility,
meaning the utility this person gets if she is without any work (ri = 1). Clearly
e ui = A − B, i.e. a person without work has a utility of A − B. Hence, the ratio
of the utility from other things (i.e. other than work) to utility from being able to
work is given by
e ui
∆ui = A
B − 1.
Hence, an increase in A denotes how the other things in life are more impor-
tant than work. An increase in A is thus associated with moving to a society
where there is reasonable social welfare and other sources of income (for instance,
through equity ownership) or where work is not as much a source of a person’s
29social recognition.5 Now note that since β = B
A, an increase in A is equivalent to
β going towards zero. This, as we have already seen pushes us towards the utili-
tarian case where egalitarianism in unemployment matters less in our MOU given
by (2). Likewise as A becomes smaller, β becomes larger. In the limit employ-
ment achieves enormous importance and our MOU converges towards a Rawlsian
evaluation.
1.5 Discussion
Before going on to discuss vulnerability in the context of poverty, it is useful to
draw out some of the distinctions between the existing literature and our paper.
First note that the bulk of the existing writing – the theoretical (e.g., Banerjee,
2000; Ligon and Schechter, 2003) and the empirical (e.g., Kamanou and Morduch,
2002) – mainly focuses on isolating individual vulnerability. It asks questions
like: ”Who is vulnerable to poverty?” and ”How do we estimate the number of
vulnerable individuals?”
Our interest, on the other hand, is in recognizing that a person who is vulner-
able to unemployment (or poverty, though we are yet to address this) is, after a
fashion, like an unemployed person and then to develop an aggregate measure of
eﬀective unemployment, that is, to ﬁnd a single number that captures the total
unemployment – actual and potential. Among the few papers that share our
concern with the aggregate are Shorrocks (1992, 1994), Paul (1992) and Borooah
5The ‘social’ cost of unemployment does not always get its due. But it is
arguable than once our basic economic needs are satisﬁed, loss of face becomes a
dominant cost of unemployment (see Sen, 1997).
30(2002).6 Borooah develops a measure, drawing on the work of Atkinson (1970;
1983) in which aggregate, eﬀective unemployment is derived from an aggregation
of separable individual utilities.
Our measure charts out a diﬀerent course based on a rejection of this separabil-
ity. Take a look at our proposed MOU again. Recall, Mβ (R) = 1
β −
n Y
i=1

1
β − ri
 1
n
and lets examine society’s view of one person’s unemployment load, or pain -
as referred to by Borooah. Using r1 as an example we can see that
∂Mβ(R)
∂r1 =
1
n(
1
β−r1)
h
1
β − Mβ (R)
i
depends on the total eﬀective unemployment as measured
by Mβ (R). Hence, if total unemployment is higher, then
∂Mβ(R)
∂r1 is lower. There-
fore ”the level of pain” that society associates with person i’s unemployment de-
pends on the level of eﬀective unemployment in society. This essential relativity
is not there in Borooah’s measure.
Further, this paper takes the view that concepts like poverty, unemployment
and even inequality cannot be reduced to pure welfarism. These are concepts that
cannot be located entirely in the welfares of individuals and their aggregation. The
same distinction that Sen (1976) drew between ethical and descriptive features of
inequality arise here in the context of unemployment and poverty. We take the
view that a greater amount of aggregate unemployment or aggregate poverty must
not be equated with diminished aggregate social welfare.7
6Interstingly, Shorrocks (1994) is among the few papers, like ours, that uses an
axiomatic approach, though the measure that he develops is very diﬀerent from
ours.
7Some economists would go even further and argue that a small amount of
unemployment may reﬂect ﬂexibility in the labor market and so be good for the
economy overall. This is not to deny that there may be a mathematical isomor-
phism between the welfarist approach and our approach. This is evident from our
Theorem 1 if we interpret ui’s as each person’s own evaluation of her utility and
think of F as a welfare function. But such interpretations are not necessary and
31This leads to an important diﬀerence between our approach and that of much
of the literature on vulnerability that uses the concept of ‘certainty-equivalence’
to evaluate vulnerability (see, for example, Ligon and Schechter, 2003). Since the
comment that follows applies equally to unemployment and poverty, we use these
terms inter-changeably here, which also makes it a useful preamble to the next
section which is purely on poverty measurement.
Suppose a person’s poverty status can change in each month and on average he
will be poor six months in a year (i.e. in each month the probability of being poor
is 1
2), and in the other six months he will be 100 dollars above poverty. Should he
be counted as poor or not? According to the certainty-equivalence approach, we
simply have to ask this person if he would prefer to change his position with that
of another person who will be never poor for the 12 months but will be exactly
on the poverty line at all times. If he says no, then this vulnerable person is
eﬀectively non-poor.
This sounds like a very reasonable exercise if our interest is in welfare. But it
is clear that the enormous literature on poverty measurement and unemployment
measurement rejects such welfarism. To understand this consider a society, x,
with 12 persons, of whom six are poor (or unemployed) and six are each 100
dollars above the poverty line. Now transport all these 12 persons to a society, y,
where they are exactly on the poverty line. Give each of them the choice of being
born into society x without saying which position she will have. Let us say the
probability that she will be poor (or unemployed) is 1
2 and the probability that she
will be non-poor with income 100 dollars above the poverty line is also 1
2.
indeed we would resist them here.
32It is entirely possible that all 12 persons prefer society x to society y. Hence,
in an ex ante sense x Pareto dominates y. Since there in no poverty (or unem-
ployment) in y and everybody prefers x to y, if we were equating poverty (and
unemployment) totally with welfare, we would be forced to say there is no poverty
(and no unemployment) in x. But that would be absurd and indeed with six poor
people in this society at all times poor, no one would say that x has no poverty.
Hence, in developing an aggregate measure of unemployment and poverty
(treating these as descriptions of society) we may be justiﬁed in rejecting the
welfarism inherent in the certainty-equivalence approach.
With this justiﬁcation of the conceptual approach adopted in this paper, we
can now proceed to discuss how the above method can be extended to measuring
eﬀective poverty.
1.6 Poverty
It should now be possible to extend our measure from the domain of unemployment
to the domain of poverty. It we treat ‘being poor’ as a uniquely well-deﬁned state,
as is implicitly assumed in using the ‘headcount rate’ measure of poverty, then it
is very easy to adopt our measure to this context. With this augmentation of
vulnerability to our concept of poverty we again argue that vulnerability is again
not necessarily a ‘bad.’ If the level of poverty, as measured by the headcount
ratio, were to stay the same, then having people at risk of becoming poor means
there exist people who are currently poor and are at risk of becoming non-poor.
Therefore, under the headcount ratio, our measure would again provide some useful
insights.
33To begin, let poverty be measured using the headcount ratio, then deﬁne pi as
the proportion of a year that a person spends below the poverty line. Therefore if
pi = 1 then a person is poor for an entire year and if pi = 0 the person is above the
poverty line for an entire year. Now we have (p1,p2,.....,pn) deﬁned as a poverty
proﬁle of a society where, for all i, pi ∈ [0,1]. Let ∆ be the collection of all
poverty proﬁles. That is, ∆ = {(p1,p2,....,pn)| n ∈ Z++ & pi ∈ [0,1], ∀i}
where Z++ is the set of strictly positive integers. Then letting n be the number
of people in a country we are able to deﬁne the ‘usual headcount ratio of poverty’
as follows:
H ≡
p1 + p2 + ..... + pn
n
(1.6)
If we deﬁne a measure of poverty (MOP) as a function P : ∆ → R+, then
H is a MOP. Adapting our measure of unemployment to the present context we
propose the following MOP
P
β (p1,.... ,pn) ≡
1
β
−
n Y
i=1
(
1
β
− pi)
1
n (1.7)
where β ∈ (0,1)
Here β would be our parameter of poverty aversion. Our MOP will satisfy all
of the properties that are discussed above. This measure of poverty is bounded
on one side by the ‘usual’ headcount ratio and on the side by a Rawlsian-type
measure of poverty.
34Ever since the celebrated work of Sen (1976), poverty is however no longer
treated as a binary concept. It is recognized that the depth of poverty a person
suﬀers can vary and good measures of poverty ought to reﬂect this. One of the
most widely used class of poverty measures is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)
class of measures which make critical use of this. If we recognize that the depth of
poverty can vary and people may be vulnerable to poverty of diﬀerent depths, how
can all this be combined into a single measure of eﬀective poverty? There must
be many ways of doing this but we shall outline a simple approach here which is
based on treating each person at each point of time as a seperate entity. Once we
use this idea of a ‘timed individual,’ it is straightforward extending our measure
of eﬀective unemployment to this domain of poverty as well.
Imagine there is a society of n individuals, each of whom we observe over m time
periods. Thus we have a total of n · m observations. Now, rather than averaging
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (hereafter referred to as FGT) measure of poverty over
time, consider the following. Take each individual i and her m observations. Let
qi be the number of periods that she was below the poverty line. Then calculate
her FGT measure of poverty pi = 1
m
Pqi
j=1(
gij
z )α, where z is the poverty line, yit is
person i’s income at time t, gij = z − yij is person i’s income gap at time j and α
is the poverty aversion parameter.
One property of the FGT measure of poverty is that it is always between zero
and one. Therefore we now have a value pi ∈ [0,1] that takes account not only of
whether person i is below the poverty line, but the depth of her poverty and we
can now substitute this pi into our MOP, deﬁned by (7), above.
351.7 Conclusion
We have oﬀered an alternative way to look at vulnerability than what is currently
being discussed in the literature and by policy makers. That is, vulnerability
need not always be viewed as a ‘bad.’ Given this perspective we have provided a
way of measuring ‘eﬀective’ unemployment or poverty. This measure is bounded
on one side by the utilitarian social measure and on the other side by a Rawls-
type social welfare measure. Furthermore, our measure satisﬁes axioms that most
people would agree are what one would want from a measure motivated by equity
concerns. We have fully characterized our measure and shown how the measure
can be applied to data in both the US and in South Africa and what insights can
be gained by comparing the ‘usual’ measure and the ‘eﬀective’ measure.
This paper then serves two purposes. First, it suggests that the current debate
on vulnerability needs to examine not only the eﬀect of vulnerability on people
currently not poor or unemployed, but also the hope that vulnerability provides
to people who are currently unemployed or poor. Secondly, this paper provides a
way of taking account of these concerns in a single measure of unemployment or
poverty and shows how the measure can actually be put to use.
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39Chapter 2
Unemployment and Family-Values
A Household Distribution Sensitive Measure of
Unemployment and Some Applications
2.1 Introduction
The standard way of measuring unemployment is simply to count the number of
unemployed individuals in a society and divide that number by the total number
of people in the labor force. Especially if the population and the size of the la-
bor force remain unchanged, there is not much more that the standard measure
of unemployment can tell us. Obviously, though, the well-being of an unem-
ployed person depends a lot on whether she lives in a household where everybody
is unemployed, or in a household where at least one person is employed. In a
household with at least one employed person the unemployed individual can hope
to get some beneﬁts from the generosity of her employed family members. Even
if no one shows her generosity, though, she can still enjoy the beneﬁts of house-
40hold public goods – heating, air-conditioning, better access to water, and more
information about the world beyond since employed people are presumably better
networked. Therefore, this connected unemployed individual is better oﬀ than
the unconnected unemployed individual, the one who lives in a fully unemployed
household. Furthermore, a child who lives in a household with connected unem-
ployed individuals will be better taken care of because they too get to enjoy the
public goods that being near an employed individual provides.
Measures of unemployment have been developed to account for the situation
where unemployment levels remain the same but durations change over time, thus
changing the burden of how unemployment is shared among the population.1
However, there seems to be little written on how to account for the household-
externality aspect of unemployment. As I will show below, though, this aspect is
an extremely important matter that can aﬀect not only well-being of an individual
but also political stability and peace. Therefore, this paper is devoted to devel-
oping a new measure of unemployment that is sensitive to this ‘household’ aspect
of unemployment.
Employment has ﬁnancial and psychological beneﬁts. Some of those beneﬁts
include monetary remuneration, access to health care, retirement beneﬁts, access
to information, a sense of pride, and a feeling of self-control. An individual that
has access to these beneﬁts can rationally predict she is better oﬀ than someone
who does not have access. As recent riots in France have shown, people who
perceive they lack access to many of these beneﬁts may become disenfranchised.
Access to employment along with the ability to see people with similar backgrounds
1For example see Basu and Nolen (2004).
41as oneself employed is what gives one the ability to know that she can realistically
expect that the beneﬁts of employment are within her reach.
The usual way of looking at unemployment, as stated above, does not always
capture these aspects of unemployment. That is why, to get an idea of the
access to employment diﬀerent groups have, its is necessary to look at the usual
unemployment rate broken down by gender, race, ethnicity or one of many other
observable factors. This breakdown does not get at all the aspects one may
feel about her relationship to the labor market. For example, areas where the
recent rioting in France has been taking place is nearly 40%, whereas the overall
unemployment rate in France is closer to 10%.2 Other countries, such as South
Africa, have even larger disparities across diﬀerent groups, though. In March of
2004 Whites had an unemployment rate of 5% and Blacks had an unemployment
rate of 33% yet no riots are currently occurring and there is even less state support
for Blacks in South Africa than immigrants in France.3
Despite the obvious and largely diﬀerent cultural and historical aspects that
play a major part in the current situations regarding employment in France and
South Africa, one point is important to hold onto, the level of unemployment
alone, even if broken down by observable characteristics, is not enough to give a
full picture of how people view their employment situation. It does not account for
whether one sees herself as able to access ﬁnancial and psychological beneﬁts from
unemployment or if someone like herself is even capable of becoming employed in
the current labor market.
2Statistics from CNN.com article entitled “Unrest Flares Amid the Curfews.”
3The unemployment rates for South Africa were calculated using data from the
March 2004 South Aﬁcan Labour Force Survey.
42Again, consider an unemployed person in two diﬀerent households, one where
everyone is unemployed and one where everyone but this individual is employed.
Supposing neither has an indeﬁnite amount of wealth to draw from, the former
household is more likely to be in need of state support and closer to entering
(if not already in) poverty. Furthermore, the unemployed individual living in a
household that is otherwise fully employed means she knows that others, who share
many of her characteristics, are employed and that she is capable of obtaining all
the beneﬁts that employment has to oﬀer. A member of the fully unemployed
household is enjoying no beneﬁts that an employed individual can bring and does
not necessarily know of anyone like herself who is employed or enjoying them.
Therefore a measure of household unemployment, the number of fully unemployed
households divided by the number of households in the economy, would more likely
correlate with the view people have of their ability to ﬁnancially beneﬁt and access
employment opportunities. This household level of unemployment, though, has
not always followed the usual unemployment trends. Gregg and Wadsworth (2001,
2004) show how the diﬀerence in household unemployment and the usual measure
of unemployment has varied over time for Britain and the United States. Dickens
and Ellwood (2003, 2001) discuss how the fully unemployed households are more
likely to be in poverty, rely on the state for ﬁnancial support and be associated with
a higher incidence of child poverty. A measure that incorporates some aspects
of the household measure of unemployment may then help policy makers more
fully capture how a labor market is doing in regards to supplying employment and
making it accessible to diﬀerent facets of society.
43The consequences of one’s attachment to the labor market has already been
looked at in the social network literature. A social network can be thought of
as an informal group of people who share social ties. These types of networks
are used to informally look for jobs in the labor market, get a promotion, raise
funds to start a new business or run a political campaign.4 Simon and Warner
(1992) and Fernandez et al. (2000), among others, show how ﬁrms gain from using
social networks when hiring workers. Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and
Montgomery (1991) show, using diﬀerent models embedded with social networks,
how being in a good network is important and desirable to a potential employee
because she will spend less time unemployed and face better job prospects if she is
in a good network. A household could be considered a social network. Therefore,
many of the beneﬁts that employment brings members of good social networks can
also be considered when looking at household externalities from employment.
Trying to account for the spread of beneﬁts from employment more equitably
among households has already become an issue of discussion in India. On the 21st
of December 2004 the National Rural Employment Guarantee Bill was introduced
to India’s parliament and became law in 2005.5 The bill guarantees a minimum
of 100 days of unemployment to speciﬁc households in India.6 In essence this
bill makes the beneﬁts from employment more attainable for people in many ar-
eas where employment was looked at as a rare state for a person to achieve or
4For a review of the sociology literature on economic activity and networks refer
to Smith-Doerr and Powell (2003).
5As reported on the 4th of February 2005 by The Hindustan Times. A copy
NREGB can be found at http://rural.nic.in/NREGbillp.pdf.
6The article, “Reform in India: Democracy’s Drawbacks,” that appeared in
the October 29th issue of the Economist mentions how the bill provides access to
employment for households in India’s poorest 200 districts.
44as something that one would associate with nepotism. Therefore, simply looking
at unemployment as an individual concept or by breaking down the unemploy-
ment rate by district in India seemed not to be enough to address the issues of
unemployment that the country wanted to address.
With the usual unemployment rate lacking the aspect of how connected one
is to the labor market, the beneﬁts that employment can bring a household and
with the importance of household levels of unemployment with regards to poverty
and well-being, it is important to develop a better understanding of employment
and how we can more accurately capture these aspects in the measures that policy
makers can use. In the next section of this paper, I lay out some axioms that are
important for an unemployment measure to satisfy and explain their implications.
In the third section I lay out the usual unemployment measure and provide a
household eﬀective measure of unemployment that captures the ideas discussed
above. The fourth section is an empirical application of the new measure and
shows how its use reranks areas of relative importance and how the employment
situation of a household aﬀects a person’s probability of being employed in diﬀerent
periods. I conclude the discussion in the ﬁfth section and discuss what further
research can be done in this area.
2.2 Characteristics of Unemployment Measures
When considering how to develop a measure of unemployment (hereafter MOU)
that takes account of these concerns there are other literatures that provide guid-
ance, the literature on literacy measures and social networks are two examples.
Measures of literacy have been developed to account for intra-household externali-
45ties as well. In the case of literacy there are many beneﬁts that are shared with-in
the household. I will use insights from these two literatures to help account for
the beneﬁts of shared public goods, information, and even insurance that having
an employed person in one’s household can bring.
Employed individuals are able to bring home information about the outside
world and share the beneﬁts of employment with the other members of their house-
hold. In a closely related idea, literates can bring beneﬁts to illiterates they live
with. Literates have the ability to help people who are illiterate by reading jobs
oﬀered in the employment section of a newspaper or a literate can explain the
newest farming technology one can use on her farm by reading a pamphlet. Since
the work of Basu and Foster (1998), measures of literacy have been developed to
deal with these types of literacy externalities. How to formalize the eﬀect that a
literate can have on an illiterate has been a point of debate, though. Basu and
Foster (1998) use a constant externality whereas Valenti (2002) and Dutta (2004)
allow the externality to vary based on the proportion of literate to illiterate indi-
viduals there are in a household and on the total number of literates present in a
household. Mitra (2002) characterizes a class of measures that is not subject to
rank reversals that the work of the above authors face with their measures. The
insights that these authors bring to dealing with intra-household externality ef-
fects are useful in the realm of measures of unemployment as well. Therefore their
contributions and insights will be cited and called upon throughout the discussion
of measures of unemployment below.
Before laying out the axioms that a MOU should satisfy, the framework in
which these axioms are to be formalized must be discussed. To begin, let x =
46 
x1,x2,...,xHx
be an economy where xh =
 
xh
1,xh
2,...,xh
nh

is a household with
nh people and there are Hx households.7 Let this economy have nx people, where
nx =
PHx
h=1 nh. For each person in this economy, xh
i , say that either person
i in household h is unemployed, that is xh
i = 1, or person i in household h
is employed, that is xh
i = 0. Therefore this economy contains information only
about each individual’s employment status and what household she belongs. While
this is a very simpliﬁed concept of an economy, the framework here can easily be
modiﬁed to take account of other information. If a policy maker would like
to keep track of the type of employment (in a bakery or construction factory for
instance) or the gender of the household member then the household vector would
become more detailed, but the properties of the measures deﬁned below would
still hold. For now, though, I will stick with the simplest case, where we only
know the employment status of an individual and the household she belongs to
Finally, say that ∆ is the set of all economies. Now I can deﬁne a Measure of
Unemployment (MOU) as a mapping M : ∆ → R, where R is the set of reals.
If each person in a household is considered as important as each other member
then an useful axiom for an MOU would be anonymity. This property says that,
at least within a household, no person should be considered any diﬀerent than any
another. At times, though, this axiom has been modiﬁed because of concerns listed
above. For example, in the context of literacy, according to Basu et al. (2002),
it seems that females are more receptive than males to the beneﬁts that living
with a literate individual can provide and that living with a literate female is more
beneﬁcial to an illiterate person than living with a literate male. In the context
7where nh and Hx are elements of Z++, the set of strictly positive integers.
47of employment one may want to also consider these possible gender diﬀerences.
For example, in this case, an employed male may be more likely to share the
beneﬁts and information he gains from employment than a female, or having the
‘head of the household’ employed may be more important than having any other
household member employed. To make this reﬁnement one would have to gather
more information on each member of an economy, not only what household she
belongs to and her employment status, but also, for example, her gender.
For use with an MOU I propose the following anonymity axiom. It is eas-
ily adjusted to take account of the issues raised above, along with many other
demographic concerns that may arise.
Anonymity (A): A MOU, M, is said to satisfy Anonymity if, for any within
household person permutation mapping, πi (∗),8 where nh is the same in both
economy x and y, xh =
 
xh
1,xh
2,...,xh
nh

, and yh =

xh
π(1),xh
π(2),...,xh
π(nh)

, it
is true that M
 
xh
= M
 
yh
.
Note that an MOU, M, is deﬁned on an individual household because an indi-
vidual household can simply be viewed as a one household economy.
This anonymity axiom allows an economy to be written as following. Let rh be
the number of employed people in household h and sh be the number of unemployed
people in household h. Since the names of people within a household do not
matter, all relevant information about a household can be written in terms of rh
and sh. Then an economy can be written as x =
 
(r1,s1),(r2,s2),...
 
rHx,sHx
where xh =
 
rh,sh
is a household with nh = rh + sh people.
8That is to say that πi : {1,2,...,ni} → {1,2,...,ni} such that πi is one-to-one
and onto ∀i.
48In order to compare economies, one economy over time or the employment
situation of diﬀerent geographic areas within a country it is convenient to know
what is the value given to the most fully employed economy and the least fully
employed economy. Consider two types of economies, e and w. Let both
economies have H households and n people (that is He = Hw = H and ne =
nw = n). Let economy e be the economy that is fully employed, that is, let
e = ((n1,0),(n2,0),...,(nH,0)). Likewise, let w be the economy that is fully
unemployed, or w = ((0,n1),(0,n2),...,(0,nH)). Now consider the following nor-
malization axiom.
Normalization (N): A MOU, M, is said to satisfy Normalization if, for any
economy with H ∈ Z++ households and n ∈ Z++ people, M (e) = 0 and
M (w) = 1.
Obviously, the normalization axiom may be modiﬁed to produce values of one’s
choosing for a fully employed or unemployed economy.
The next axiom, decomposability, is not without controversy. I believe that
decomposability is appropriate in the discussion of unemployment, in part, because
of its desirability for policy makers. To consider the axiom lets ﬁrst deﬁne the
concept of decomposability.
I will say that economy x =
 
(r1,s1),...,
 
rf,sf
,
 
rf+1,sf+1
,...
 
rHx,sHx
∈
∆ is decomposed into economies y and z if y =
 
(r1,s1),...,
 
rf,sf
∈ ∆ and
z =
  
rf+1,sf+1
,...
 
rHx,sHx
∈ ∆. This allows the following form of the
decomposition axiom to be stated.
49Decomposition (D): Let economy x ∈ ∆ be decomposed into economies y,
z ∈ ∆. A MOU, M, is said to satisfy Decomposition if M (x) =
ny
nxM (y)+
nz
nxM (z).
The main critique of the decomposability axiom is that any MOU that satisﬁes
it rules out the possibility of inter-household externalities. For example, consider
a two household economy b = (b1,b2). By assuming decomposability the presence
of the second household, b2, has no eﬀect on how the MOU, M, values the ﬁrst
household, b1, or, with some abuse of notation, assuming decomposability requires
that M (b1|b2) = M (b1). If there were inter-household externalities then, under
certain conditions, having one type of household present should changes the value
that the MOU, M, puts on b1. That is, ins some situations one may want to
allow for the case that M (b1|b2) 6= M (b1). By assuming the decomposability
axiom holds this cannot occur. To get around this issue one could argue that
a ‘household’ can be interpreted liberally, as a neighborhood or social group for
instance. As long as a the group boundaries can be concretely deﬁned then the
MOU presented in this paper can be modiﬁed to take account of certain inter-
‘household’ externalities.9
Decomposition, while being debatable, has a very obvious and practical feature.
It allows an economy’s MOU to be written simply as the weighted sum of the
MOU applied to each household in the economy. The weights implied with this
decomposition axiom are simply the proportion of the number of people in the
household to the number of people in the economy.
9For further discussion of the decomposition axiom and its implications please
refer to Mitra (2002).
50Lemma 1: For any economy x ∈ ∆ and any MOU, M, that satisﬁes D that
economy’s MOU can be written as the weighted sum of the MOU applied to
its households, that is M (x) =
Hx P
h=1
nh
nxM
  
rh,sh
.
The proof of this lemma is trivial (so it is not laid out here) and requires only
that the decomposability axiom be applied repeatedly.
Finally, if an economy is the same as another in every fashion except that one
more person is employed in the second economy then no reasonable MOU should
rank the second economy as having more unemployment than the ﬁrst economy.
In fact, given that more people are employed in the second economy, it beyond
reasonable to say that the unemployment in the second economy is less then in
the ﬁrst economy. To formalize this I use the following monotonicity axiom.
Monotonicity (O): Let economies x,y ∈ ∆ be such that xm
k > ym
k and xh
i = yh
i
∀(h,i) 6= (m,k). A MOU, M, is said to satisfy Monotonicity if M (x) >
M (y).
With the monotonicity and normalization axiom we now know that for any
economy x ∈ ∆, it must be the case that M (x) ∈ [0,1].
The axioms listed above are commonly used in measures of well-being and
do not place any real limit on the set of measures that can be used to look at
unemployment. The set of measures that satisfy these axioms in fact include
measures that both take account of externalities, see Valenti (2002) for instance,
and measures that do not, the usual measure of unemployment – that will be
formalized shortly – for instance. Therefore to generate a measure appropriate to
concerns of employment and its externalities discussed above one needs to look to
51producing at least one other axiom that will give structure to our measure and,
hopefully, fully characterize a class of measures that addresses these concerns.
2.3 Eﬀective Unemployment and Externalities
The set of measures satisfying axioms A, N, D and O (hereafter referred to as
the ANDO axioms) listed above is large and barely helpful as a starting point
of where to look for a measure of unemployment that takes account of access to
employment and the many beneﬁts that unemployment brings. To begin reﬁning
the set of measures that would be desirable I look at the usual MOU and a full
characterization of it.
Let the usual measure of unemployment, U, for any economy, x ∈ ∆, be
written as follows:
U (x) =
1
nx
Hx X
h=1
s
h
Recall that rh is the number of employed people in household h and sh is the
number of unemployed people in household h. Therefore the usual MOU, U, is
simply the proportion of the population that is unemployed. This measure is
not sensitive to how unemployment is distributed across households. As long as
the sum
Hx P
h=1
sh is the same across economies or time U will be constant. This
measure, in the context of literacy, was fully characterized by Basu and Foster
(1998) by using an indiﬀerence axiom. The indiﬀerence axiom formalized the
fact that as long as the proportion of unemployed people stayed the same any
MOU, M, satisfying the indiﬀerence axiom had be insensitive to the distribution
of employment in an economy. The usual MOU, U, satisﬁes the indiﬀerence
52axiom. To see this, and for later discussions, consider three economies, x, y, z
∈ ∆, such that x = {(0,2),(2,0)}, y = {(1,1),(1,1)}, and z = {(2,2)}. Therefore
economies x and y both have two, two-person households. In economy x all
unemployed individuals are in one household and in economy y each household
has exactly one employed and one unemployed individual. Economy, z, though,
has only one four-person household with two people employed and two people
unemployed. Given the network structure of labor markets and the information
sharing that can take place between members of a household, one could argue that
the unemployed members of economies y and z are at least as well oﬀ as those
in economy x. The usual MOU does not rank these economies in that manner,
though. Using U all three economies are ranked the same, that is U (x) = U (y) =
U (z) = 1
2.
Now lets look at how to address the distributional concerns that are ignored
by the usual MOU. Consider an economy with a ﬁxed employment level and only
one type of job available. Let there be a positive probability of being ﬁred in
each period and assume that social networks are used to hire employees from the
labor market. Many prominent economists have used this as a starting point
in constructing labor market models.10 If an employed person is working at a
ﬁrm that is hiring, it is reasonable to expect she will mention the opening to any
unemployed member of her household. The unemployed person could also hear
of the employment opportunity through newspaper ads or other mass advertising
campaigns. The point is to notice that a person in a fully unemployed household,
10See Simon and Warner (1992), Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004), and Mont-
gomery (1991) for examples of these approaches.
53though, only has the opportunity to hear about the job opening through the mass
advertising and not through any household member. Therefore, at any given point
in time, an unemployed individual who lives with an employed person is more likely
to hear of employment openings than if the same unemployed individual lived in
a household with no employed persons. Besides information about employment
opportunities the employed person can also bring home information about what
type of skills are desired in the workplace. All these “employment information
beneﬁts” that an unemployed person can gain are on top oﬀ the (more important)
public goods beneﬁts that an employed person brings to the household. All this
suggests that the unemployed members in the households of economies y and z are
at least as well oﬀ as the unemployed persons in the ﬁrst household of economy x.
An MOU, M, that at least ranks economies y and z as having less unemployment
than x, that is M (y) ≤ M (x) and M (z) ≤ M (x), would then be more appropriate
in this situation.
Consider only economies y = {(1,1),(1,1)} and z = {(2,2)} now. While
it is true that today, the two unemployed people in economy z will compete for
public goods, wealth and information brought home by the employed individuals,
once one of the unemployed individuals gets a job, the remaining individual will
now be the recipient of these beneﬁts from three employed people. This ‘long-
run’ consideration regarding the amount of public goods, wealth and information
outweighs the ‘short-run’ competition for information among the currently unem-
ployed. This is one concept raised in Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and is
demonstrated with regards to employment information using some computational
examples. Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004), though, have a very speciﬁc net-
54work model, which should not merely be compared to the colloquial concept of
a household as I am doing here. With this argument, though, the unemployed
people in economy z can be seen as having at least as much access to public goods,
wealth and information, as those in economy y. Therefore the unemployed in
economy z should be considered at least as well oﬀ as those in y, or M(z) ≤ M(y).
Given the nature of employment externalities and the beneﬁts that access to
employment can bring, I argue that any MOU aiming to be sensitive to the dis-
tribution of unemployment across individuals and households should be designed
to satisfy the following better household axiom. Beforehand, though, say that
economy y is created from economy x by a household unemployment switch if:
economies x and y have greater than 2 and the same number of households,
Hx = Hy ≥ 2; that each household in x has the same number of employed in-
dividuals as its counterpart in y, rhx = rhy ∀h ∈ {1,2,...,H}; that all but the
last two households in x and y have the same number of unemployed individuals,
shx = shy ∀h ∈ {1,2,...,H − 2}; and, ﬁnally, that there is exactly one more un-
employed individual in household H −1 in economy y than in economy x and one
less unemployed individual in household H in economy y than in economy x, that
is sHy−1 − 1 = sHx−1 and sHy + 1 = sHx.
Better Household (B): Let economy y ∈ ∆ be created from economy x ∈ ∆
by a household unemployment switch. Any MOU, M, is said to satisfy
the Better Household axiom if it is true that M (x) > M (y) if and only if
rHx < rHx−1.
This axiom implies that it is “better,” for an unemployed person to be in a
household with more employed persons. This is irrespective of how many unem-
55ployed people are present in the household. Of course this axiom is only reasonable
as long as household size is within some limit. In the empirical section below I
look at some of the possible implications of this axiom and how applicable it is in
practice.
Using this axiom I can formalize the idea that employment is not simply a bi-
nary state but can be looked at as moving closer or further away from employment.
I deﬁne the following eﬀective employment value based on xh
i :
p
h
i =

 
 
0 if xh
i = 0
g
 
rh
if xh
i = 1

 
 
Where g (0) = 1 and g
 
rh
> g
 
rk
> 0 if rh < rk.
Therefore if someone lives in a household with no employed individuals and
she, herself, is not employed, then her eﬀective value is the same as her original
unemployment value, one. If she lives in a household with three other individuals
and is unemployed, though, her eﬀective unemployment value is no longer one in
all cases, in fact her eﬀective unemployment value can now take the form g (1) if
one person in her household is employed, g (2) if two people in her household are
employed and so on. Therefore, when unemployed, an individual living in a four
person household can take on any of the following eﬀective unemployment values:
1, g (1), g (2), g (3) where 0 < g (3) < g (2) < g (1) < 1. Therefore we now have
a multivariate formalization of unemployment, or an eﬀective value that we can
place on the unemployment of a person within a particular household.
I will now use this formalization to deﬁne a new MOU that is sensitive not only
to the level of unemployment in an economy but its distribution across households
56and individuals. Call this MOU the household adjusted eﬀective measure
of unemployment and deﬁne it in the following manner:
M
∗ (x) =
1
nx
Hx X
h=1
g
 
r
h
s
h
This household adjusted eﬀective MOU, M∗, satisﬁes axioms B, A, N, D and O
(hereafter referred to as the BANDO axioms) and is actually a class of measures
because diﬀerent functional forms of g produce diﬀerent household adjusted eﬀec-
tive MOU (hereafter referred to as HAE). Unlike the class of measures represented
by M∗, please note that the usual MOU, U, however, does not satisfy the BANDO
axioms. In fact, as shown in the theorem below, the class of measures deﬁned by
HAE, M∗, are the only measures that satisfy the BANDO axioms.
Theorem: A measure of unemployment, M, satisﬁes the BANDO axioms if and
only if it is M∗.
Proof. To show that M∗ satisﬁes the BANDO axioms is trivial and will not
be shown here.
Let M be a MOU that satisﬁes the BANDO axioms.
Since M satisﬁes axiom D, then, by Lemma 1, it is true that for any x ∈ ∆,
M (x) =
Hx P
h=1
nh
nxM
  
rh,sh
.
Now deﬁne g
 
rh
≡
 
1 + rh
M
  
rh,1

; that is, g
 
rh
is the eﬀect of rh
people being employed on one unemployed individual in household h.
Let rh = 0, then g (0) = M ((0,1)) = 1 by axiom N.
Let rh > 0, then, by axiom O
g
 
rh
=
 
1 + rh
M
  
rh,1

>
 
1 + rh
M
  
rh + 1,0

.
By axiom N, though, M
  
rh + 1,0

= 0 so g
 
rh
> 0 for all rh > 0.
57Let rh > rk, then M
  
rh,0

,
 
rk,1

> M
  
rh,1

,
 
rk,0

by axiom B. Using
axiom D and simplifying
rhM
  
rh,0

+
 
1 + rk
M
  
rk,1

>
 
1 + rh
M
  
rh,1

+ rkM
  
rk,0

.
By applying axiom N twice, because M
  
rh,0

= M
  
rk,0

= 0, the equation
simpliﬁes further to
 
1 + rk
M
  
rk,1

>
 
1 + rh
M
  
rh,1

. So g
 
rk
>
g
 
rh
when rh > rk.
Now consider economies x,y ∈ ∆ such that Hx = Hy = s and rhx = rhy =
r ∀h ∈ {1,2,...,s}. Let the unemployed be distributed among households as
follows in economy x = ((r,s),(r,0),...,(r,0)), and as follows in economy y =
((r,1),(r,1),...,(r,1)).
By axiom D M (x) = r+s
sr+sM ((r,s)) +
r(s−1)
sr+s M ((r,0))
By axiom N this simpliﬁes to M(x) = r+s
sr+sM ((r,s))
By axiom D M (y) =
s(r+1)
sr+s M ((r,1))
Then, as an implication of axiom B, it is true that M(x) = M(y)
So, with simpliﬁcation, (r + s)M ((r,s)) = s(r + 1)M (r,1) = g (r)s.
Thus, for household (r,s), this implies M ((r,s)) =
g(r)s
r+s .
Plugging this into the equation for M (x) and using the identity nh = rh + sh
a MOU, M, that satisﬁes the BANDO axioms must have an eﬀective employment
value function g (r) > 0 ∀r > 0 such that g
 
rk
> g
 
rh
if rk < rh and g (0) = 1
and must be of the form
M
∗ =
1
nx
Hx X
h=1
g
 
r
h
s
h
or, another way to put it, a MOU, M, that satisﬁes the BANDO axioms must
be a household adjusted eﬀective measure of unemployment.
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solely to the class of measures deﬁned by M∗, this is still are rather large set.
Therefore, further reﬁnements of the axioms or exploration into how the class of
measures could be restricted would also be useful for policy makers and researchers.
Since any MOU that has the characteristics laid out here must be of the form
M∗ it may now be useful to look at certain functional forms the eﬀective value
function can take on, or diﬀerent ways of implementing M∗. Consider ﬁrst why the
household unemployment rate, though important to a household’s dependency on
the state and child poverty, does not ﬁt into the class of measures deﬁned by M∗. A
household unemployment rate would have to give every member of the household
an eﬀective unemployment rate of zero if only one person in the household was
employed. Therefore, for a household measure of unemployment one would set
g (r) = 0 for any r > 0 and g (0) = 1. This does not satisfy the properties that
the eﬀective employment value function must have. Call this measure, MHH and
notice that while accounting for the distribution of employment across households
this type of measure is callus towards the employment of individuals, unless (of
course) they lived alone. Likewise, as stated before, the usual unemployment rate,
U , while caring about individuals is indiﬀerent to the distribution of employment
across households.
The HAE measures, on the other hand, are somewhere between how MHH and
U look at an unemployed individual and the g(r) function actually allows a pol-
icy maker to choose how she would like to weigh individual employment concerns
against the distribution of employment across households. Furthermore, while
weighing individual employment distribution and household employment distribu-
59tion oﬀ against each other, the HAE measures are not simply a convex combination
of MHH and U but instead place diﬀerent weights on each unemployed person de-
pending on her household situation. Measures like this have been presented in
the context of literacy by Valenti (2002) and Dutta (2004), but Dutta places the
axioms on the literacy measures themselves and Valenti reaches a measure with
these properties through weakening an axiom of equality which says that a society
is in the best situation when the ratio of literates to illiterates is the same in each
household.
To explore the usefulness of the HAE measures I look at an empirical example
below and show how relative rankings of US states change and empirically examine
how one could generate values for the eﬀective employment value function and look
at the better household axiom to see if there is any evidence supporting its use.
2.4 Empirical Example
In this section I use the March 2004 Current Population Survey (hereafter CPS) to
create a ranking of the unemployment levels for the 50 US states and the District
of Columbia. For each state and the District of Columbia four measures are
calculated: the usual unemployment rate; two HAE unemployment rates; and the
household unemployment rate. The household unemployment rate, denoted as the
‘HH Measure’ is the percentage of fully unemployed households over the number of
households that have a member in the labor force. The class of measures deﬁned
by M∗ include measures that have a strictly convex eﬀective employment value
functions. Two of these measures are used in Table 2.1 below. The functional form
used to develop the rankings for the two HAE measures shown below is g
 
rh
= αrh
60where α ∈ (0,1) and is constant. This form of the eﬀective employment value
function satisﬁes the required properties discussed above. In this example, α is
set to 1
4 and 3
4 and the measures associated with these values of α will be denoted
HAE .25 and HAE .75 respectively.
Table 2.1 was constructed using the household identiﬁer and the labor force
recode information included with the CPS. The table shows the 50 states and the
District of Columbia listed from top to bottom. States at the top have the lowest
unemployment rate according to the measure labeled at the top of the column
and states at the bottom have the highest unemployment rate according to the
unemployment rate labeled at the top of the column. Four states are emboldened:
Massachusetts, Wyoming, Oklahoma and California. Given that the usual un-
employment rate and the household unemployment rate are two extreme ways of
looking at unemployment one might expect that as a HAE measure approaches one
extreme or the other states may move monotonically up or down in the rankings.
While this is the case with Wyoming and California, which become steadily lower
and higher ranked, respectively, Massachusetts and Oklahoma show that this is
not a rule. Massachusetts moves up and than back down in the rankings and
Oklahoma gains and then loses ground with respect to the other states that are
depicted. These non-monotonicities come from the diﬀerent weights placed on
the unemployed. These weights, based on the eﬀective employment value func-
tion, are based on the employment proﬁle of the household that each unemployed
person belongs to. Therefore, the HAE measures are going to be sensitive not
only to the number of unemployed individuals in each state but also to the type of
household they reside in. This shows that much consideration should be given to
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Georgia Georgia Hawaii Hawaii
Wyoming Mississippi Mississippi Mississippi
Mississippi Wyoming Georgia Georgia
Nebraska Hawaii Nebraska Nebraska
Hawaii Nebraska New Hampshire New Hampshire
New Hampshire New Hampshire Wyoming Delaware
North Dakota North Dakota Delaware Wyoming
Maryland Delaware North Dakota North Dakota
Iowa Iowa Iowa Oklahoma
South Dakota Maryland Oklahoma Iowa
Virginia South Dakota South Dakota South Dakota
Oklahoma Virginia Virginia Virginia
Delaware Oklahoma Maryland Idaho
Tennessee Tennessee Vermont Colorado
Vermont Vermont Idaho Vermont
Nevada Nevada Colorado Maryland
North Carolina Idaho Tennessee Tennessee
Idaho Colorado Nevada Utah
New Mexico North Carolina Utah Nevada
Colorado Florida Massachusetts Minnesota
Florida New Mexico Minnesota Missouri
Missouri Missouri Missouri Massachusetts
Maine Arizona Florida Arizona
Arizona Maine Arizona Florida
Alabama Massachusetts New Jersey New Jersey
New Jersey New Jersey North Carolina Kansas
Massachusetts Minnesota Maine North Carolina
Kansas Utah Kansas Maine
Minnesota Kansas Indiana Indiana
Arkansas Indiana New Mexico Connecticut
Indiana Alabama Texas New Mexico
Montana Arkansas Connecticut Wisconsin
Utah Texas Wisconsin Texas
Texas Rhode Island Rhode Island Illinois
Rhode Island Wisconsin Illinois Rhode Island
Wisconsin Montana Ohio Ohio
Illinois Illinois Alabama Pennsylvania
Louisiana Ohio Pennsylvania Kentucky
Ohio Connecticut Arkansas Alabama
West Virginia Pennsylvania Kentucky Arkansas
Connecticut Louisiana Montana Montana
Pennsylvania West Virginia Louisiana Louisiana
Kentucky Kentucky West Virginia California
South Carolina South Carolina California New York
Washington California New York West Virginia
New York New York South Carolina South Carolina
California Washington District Of Columbia Washington
District Of Columbia District Of Columbia Washington District Of Columbia
Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan
Oregon Oregon Oregon Oregon
Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska
Table 2.1
Rankings of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia for four types of measures of 
unemployment: "Usual" is the typical unemployment measure; "HAE .75" and "HAE .25" are 
the household adjusted effective MOU using an alpha value of .75 and .25 respectively.  The 
four emboldened states show non-montonicities that can develop with different measures.
62the choice of the employment value function because the ranking will be sensitive
to the form that is chosen. The choice should obviously depend on cultural, social
and empirical observations.
One way to see what form of an employment value function may be appropri-
ate for a society is to examine what empirical evidence exists on how having an
employed person in one’s household aﬀects her ability to become employed at a
certain point in the future. This is because job information is one type of beneﬁt
that knowing an employed individual brings. This type of analysis will also help
examine one of the justiﬁcations for using the better household axiom – that hav-
ing an employed person in one’s household is beneﬁcial in at least one aspect, the
ability to ﬁnd employment (due to more information about job vacancies).
To look at these two issues I present three probit regressions in Tables 2.2, 2.3
and 2.4. Tables 2.2 and 2.4 show the eﬀect of having one, two or three people
employed on an unemployed person from the same household in September of 2001.
The base group are people who are in households where everyone is unemployed.
Note that these regressions do not control for the number of unemployed people
in the household, so they are, in essence, seeing if the better household axiom
is empirically justiﬁable with regards to employment information. Given that
someone was unemployed in September of 2001, table 2.2 shows the marginal eﬀects
of being in a household with one, two or three people employed in September of
2001 on the probability of being employed four months later, in December of 2001.
To look even further down the road, table 2.4 shows the marginal eﬀects of being
in a household with one, two or three people employed in September of 2001 on the
probability of being employed ﬁfteen months later, in November of 2002. All the
63Dependent 
Variable:
Independent 
Variables:
One person 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Two people 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Three people 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Marginal 
Effect:
0.1843* 0.3250** 0.1866
* Significant at 5% level, ** Significant at 1% level
Employed or not in Dec 2001 given person 
was unemployed in Sep 2001
Table 2.2
Probit regression on whether someone is employed in December 2001, 
given she was not employed in September 2001 (four months earlier)
Number of Obs: 185
marginal eﬀects are positive, supporting the applicability of the better household
axiom. The marginal eﬀects of being in a household with one or two employed
people are statistically signiﬁcant.
The number of observations in both of these probits is not large, that is why,
unfortunately, I do not control for factors such as race, overall household size or
household assets. Despite these detractions the regressions show, at least on the
surface, that there may be some empirical justiﬁcation for one aspect supporting
the use of the better household axiom. Likewise, table 2.3 again oﬀers some
support for the better household axiom. Table 2.3 shows that, given that someone
was unemployed in December of 2001, the marginal eﬀects of being in a household
with one, two or three people employed in one’s household in December of 2001
on the probability of being employed eleven months later, in November of 2002,
are again all positive. The statistical signiﬁcance of the marginal eﬀects are given
in the tables.
64Dependent 
Variable:
Independent 
Variables:
One person 
employed in 
Household in Dec 
2001
Two people 
employed in 
Household in Dec 
2001
Three people 
employed in 
Household in Dec 
2001
Marginal 
Effect:
0.1413* 0.0974 0.1511
* Significant at 5% level
Number of Obs: 168
Employed or not in Nov 2002 given person 
was unemployed in Dec 2001
Table 2.3
Probit regression on whether someone is employed in November 2002, 
given she was not employed in December 2001 (eleven months earlier)
Dependent 
Variable:
Independent 
Variables:
One person 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Two people 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Three people 
employed in 
Household in Sep 
2001
Marginal 
Effect:
0.1471* 0.1990* 0.1206
* Significant at 5% level
Number of Obs: 178
Employed or not in Nov 2002 given person 
was unemployed in Sep 2001
Table 2.4
Probit regression on whether someone is employed in November 2002, 
given she was not employed in September 2001 (fifteen months earlier)
65Using the tables above one could begin to suggest an eﬀective employment value
function for the US economy during this period. For example, if a policy maker
were interested in how to value an unemployed person’s current state then she
could set g(1) = 1 − 0.1843 = 0.8166 and g(2) = 0.675. Using enough regressions
and time periods a policy maker could develop a better empirical estimate of how
she may want to value an unemployed person is a speciﬁc type of household. Of
course, a policy maker could also use her experience, intelligence or any other
insights she may have to choose the form of the eﬀective value function without
the need to turn to the data. Given how the relative rankings changed so much
in Table 1, though, it is clear that a decent amount of thought should be used in
setting the eﬀective employment value function.
2.5 Conclusion
Unemployment does not only eﬀect an individual. It eﬀects her household, how
she perceives herself and the opportunities and information that she has available
to her. In countries that lack much state support or where unemployment is con-
centrated in speciﬁc households, unemployment can lead to, or become a catalyst
for, unrest and the disenfranchisement of certain groups or peoples. This aspect
of detachment is not captured solely by looking at the usual unemployment rate
broken down by regional or demographic characteristics. This is because employ-
ment and its beneﬁts are earned not only by being employed, but also through
being connected to the labor market. These connections to employed individuals
and the outside world bring such important beneﬁts as better access to water,
heating, cooling and information from the world outside of one’s household. This
66type of connection is captured by the household adjusted eﬀective unemployment
measures. Furthermore these measures are sensitive not only to the distribution of
unemployment across households, but also to the level of individual unemployment
in a society.
The unrest in France and the unemployment issues facing such countries as
South Africa and India are both examples of how employment and the attach-
ments to its beneﬁts are important for members of a particular nation. India has
already adopted a policy that directly deals with these issues in its National Rural
Employment Guarantee Bill. Some of the issues that India is addressing in this
bill are formalized in the HAE measures above. These policy related examples
are not the only issues suggesting that the HAE measures are an appropriate way
to further our understanding of the labor market. The social network literature
has already shown us how the connection that one has to informal networks can
lead to better employment situations or lower drop out rates. Therefore, one
strand of literature already being used among labor economists provides a natural
motivation for looking at the HAE measures of unemployment.
In the empirical section of this paper, after being fully characterized, the house-
hold adjusted eﬀective MOU is shown to have a large eﬀect on the relative rankings
when applied to US states and the District of Columbia. It does so by treating
unemployment no longer as binary but as multivariate, where the weight placed
on an unemployed individual depends on which household she resides in. House-
hold unemployment has been shown to have strong correlations with poverty and
other measures of wellbeing and the household adjusted eﬀective measures capture
this relationship by giving incorporating sensitivity to the distribution of unem-
67ployment across households. The last part of the empirical section sketches how
one could empirically estimate the eﬀective value function and provides justiﬁ-
cation for the better household axiom. Therefore, with the importance of how
unemployment is distributed across individuals and households and the empirical
suggestion that the better household axiom is justiﬁable, the household adjusted
eﬀective measures of unemployment capture the fuller picture of employment that
is presented in this paper.
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70Chapter 3
Racial Identity, Performance and
Self-Conﬁdence
A South African Experiment1
3.1 Introduction
Racial diﬀerences across measures of performance is common; whether it be a black-
white wage gap (see Carrington and Troske (1998) or Card and Krueger (1991)
for instance), an athlete’s compensation (see Kahn (1992)), or in unemployment
rates (see Kingdon and Knight (2004)). Despite these diﬀerences, though, it is
not easy to explain why racial divides exist. Do racial gaps exist because of
weak information on workers’ skill or is there a more malicious reason? If they
exist, could biological diﬀerences be a reason for the gap in racial income levels?
Economists have so far attempted to explain some of the racial gaps by diﬀerences
1This work is co-authored with Erica Field.
71in the backgrounds between racial groups. Neal and Johnson (1996) argue that
premarket factors such as education and family backgroup explain much of the
black-white wage gap. We ﬁnd that, despite what explanitory power pre-market
situations may provide, real ex post diﬀerences can occur between similar ex ante
groups solely because of the salience of racial identity.
Employers, referees or admission oﬃcers may see race as an imperfect proxy
for family background, income level or a person’s skill set but recent studies have
shown that other factors may be contributing to diﬀerent levels of performances
across racial groups. For instance, stereotypes that a society hold could be part
of the explanation. Steele et. al. (2002) review the work on the inﬂuences of
racial stereotypes on performance for the last decade or so. Their research shows
that merely framing a task diﬀerently or activating a racial stereotype, through a
questionnaire or checking oﬀ a box next to a person’s race, can cause a someone to
perform worse.2 Ambady et. al. (2001) show how activating positive stereotypes
can cause a person to perform better on a math exam.3 These psychological factors
reveal how nearly ex ante identical groups can have real ex post diﬀerences in their
performance by solely by mentioning race. Recently economists have begun to
examine what eﬀects these psychological factors could have on competition and
performance. Gneezy et. al. (2004) show how varying the gender make-up of a
group can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of women in a competitive
environment. Explaining why a woman performs worse when a man is present is
2Steele and his co-authors have measured the eﬀects of stereotype threat on a
variety of tasks: golﬁng, SATs, AP exams, ect. In all of the settings they have
looked at stereotype threat has had a negative inﬂuence on the performance of
individuals whose race is associated with a negative stereotype.
3The math exam was a section of the SAT.
72not an easy task. Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004), using an experimental design, show
that when caste is mentioned with students in India those students perform worse
than if caste wasn’t mentioned at all. Both of these studies use mazes to test the
eﬀect of gender and caste salience, respectively. In our experiment, we too use
mazes of roughly the same type to exam what eﬀect the payments schemes and
salience of racial identity has on students.
Examining what eﬀect these psychological factors have on performance of dif-
ferent racial groups could go a long way to explaining why racial diﬀerences exist
in areas of performance, self-conﬁdence or even attitudes to risk. We ﬁnd that
cuing students to their race has real eﬀects on their level of performance and how
they view their ability.
In this paper we run an experiment in Cape Town, South Africa with primary
school students aged 10 and 11. This age group was the same used in the work
done by Ambady et. al. (2001) and Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004). The former study
found that cuing a student to her race, when her race was associated with a positive
stereotype, had a positive eﬀect on a student’s performance. Both studies found
that cuing a student to her race, when her race was associated with a negative
stereotype, had a negative eﬀect on a student’s performance. By using the same
age group as the above researchers we can examine how our sample of South
African students compare to the basic ﬁndings laid out above. The negative
eﬀects of stereotypes have been also been found in the work by Steele and his
colleagues and Gneezy et. al. (2004). In our work we too ﬁnd these negative
eﬀects on performance when a negative stereotype is associated with a student’s
race but we also ﬁnd that cuing a student to her race when segregated, even when
73her race is associated with negative stereotype, causes a student to perform better,
unlike in these earlier studies. Our work shows that the eﬀect of racial stereotypes
is largely dependent on the make-up of a group and not necessarily the sentiment
of the stereotype. Besides looking at solely performance, though, we examine the
issue of self-conﬁdence and choices that students make when they have been cued
to their race (we cue students to their race by using questionnaires).
Whether to educate one’s child, play hokey from school, search for a job, or even
whether to use a condom are choices in which people’s belief about their abilities
come into play. If a parent believes that her child, independent of ability, will not
get a good education, then why waste the money and sacriﬁce free labor at home
to let that child attend school? If a male growing up in West Africa cannot fathom
himself without AIDS when he is older then, even if he understands the beneﬁts
using a condom can bring, why would he chose to use one? How one view’s her
ability eﬀects her educational, employment and personal decisions. If cuing one
to her race aﬀects performance what eﬀect does racial identity (by this we mean
making a person aware of her race) have on someone’s view of her abilities, or
more generally, her level of self-conﬁdence. With these far reaching implications
of racial identity our experiment was designed to not only see what eﬀect racial
cuing had on performance but also on self-conﬁdence and how one places herself
within a group. Looking at self-conﬁdence, performance and how one places herself
within a group will give us a better understanding of why people of diﬀerent races
may perform diﬀerently, make diﬀerent choices or vary in the family background.
We ﬁnd that formerly oppressed groups in South Africa, blacks and coloureds,
show they are more likely to believe that they are capable of performing a task
74when they are cued to their race but, when actually attempting the task, perform
worse. Furthermore black and coloured students are likely to place themselves
lower within a group when race is made salient
This paper proceeds as follows: in section 3.2 we explain the methods used in
our experiment; in section 3.3 we lay out predictions of how students will react
within diﬀerent settings; section 3.4 explains our results and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Methods
In this section we explain the basics of our experiment. We discuss the setting,
the subjects that were involved, the laboratory our experiment took place in, and
the experimental design we used.
3.2.1 Setting
South Africa’s ﬁrst all-race election took place in April 1994. Before then not all
South Africans were able to fully participate in the governmental process because
of policies commonly known as ‘Apartheid.’ These policies did their best to keep
interracial interactions at a minimum. While these factious policies have been
repealed many of the racial divisions that were created under them have yet to
fully heal. With the recent past of stark racial division, South Africa provides a
unique opportunity to study the eﬀects of racial identity and stereotypes.
We choose to focus on students aged ten and eleven in our experiment because
they would have been born after the ﬁrst all race elections and they were fully
educated without the formal policies of Apartheid in place. Furthermore, using
75students in this age range allows our study to be compared with work done by other
researchers.4 Schools in Cape Town are, not surprisingly given the recent past,
still very segregated. In 2004 the metropolitan Cape Town area had 729 primary
schools registered with the Western Cape Educational Department (WCED). Of
those schools, 90% could be categorized as majority black, white or coloured. We
deﬁne a racial majority school as having more than 50% of the student population
of that race. At a majority black school, for instance, more than half the students
would be black. Furthermore 72% of all schools could be categorized as having
more than 80% of their students as being from one racial group. The concentration
of racial groups by school along with the fact that 37% of students aged 10 and
11 in Cape Town are black, 56% are coloured, and 7% are white speaks to how
segregated Cape Town remains.
Besides racial divisions, schools, and Cape Town more generally, are also di-
vided by language and economic status. Black majority schools are more likely
to be Xhosa medium while white and coloured schools are more likely to be En-
glish medium. A dwindling amount of white and coloured majority schools are
Afrikaans medium. In our sample, only two of the 15 schools had students that
were taught only in Afrikaans. Those two schools were dual-medium schools where
some of the students were educated in English and the others were educated in
Afrikaans. No purely Afrikaans medium school agreed to participate in our ex-
periment, though, some were approached.5 These linguistic diﬀerences are highly
correlated with race and serve as a way of cuing people to the diﬀerences that re-
main between racial groups. Because of this we were able to use questions about
4see Ambady et. al. (2001) or Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004) for instance.
5We speak more about selection issues later on.
76language to help cue students to their racial status; we also had to accommodate
the primary language that a student spoke.
One other major division that still exists in South Africa is economic status.
In the Cape Town area 85% of Blacks make less than R577 (≈$96) and only 1.38%
make more than R1387 (≈$231) per week, if working, whereas 48% of Whites make
more than R1387 and only 8% make less than R577, if working. Coloureds are
economically in the middle of Blacks and Whites; 51% make less than R577 and
6% make more than R1387, if working.6 The unemployment rates for diﬀerent
racial groups in the Cape Town area are even starker: 38% of Blacks are oﬃcially
unemployed; 15% of Coloureds are oﬃcially unemployed; and only 5% of Whites
are unemployed. With these income and employment diﬀerences other wealth
indicators, such as if one owns property or the size of one’s house, are highly
correlated with race as well.
Given that we aimed to include students of diﬀerent racial and income groups
in our sample we used the racial divide between school to randomly sample schools.
Using the list of schools provided by WCED we broke schools with 100 or more
students aged 10 and 11 into three strata: black majority schools; coloured ma-
jority schools; and white majority schools. We then sampled schools randomly
using probabilities proportional to the size of the school. That is, if school A had
90 students aged 10 and 11, and school B had only 10 students then we would
randomly choose school A with 90% probability and school B with 10% probabil-
ity. This allowed us to pick students from the “average” type of school in each
6These statistics are for gross salary per week and based on the March 2005
Labour Force Survey.
77strata. Using this technique we approached the principals at six randomly chosen
black majority schools, three randomly chosen coloured majority schools and three
randomly chosen white majority schools to see if they would let their students par-
ticipate. Only one black or coloured majority school refused to participate. This
means that we were able to randomly sample black and coloured majority schools
without worrying about any real selection issues. Approaching white majority
schools was not as easy.
The principals at white majority schools, especially ones that were Afrikaans
medium, were very reluctant to have the students involved in what they felt was a
‘cultural’ project. In fact every principal at an Afrikaans medium school refused
to let their students participate. We were then forced to go with white majority
schools where the principals were more open to our project; these were schools
closer to the center of Cape Town. This means that the students in our sample
from white majority schools are more likely to be at an English medium school and
more likely to live near the center of Cape Town than a randomly chosen student
from a white majority school.
3.2.2 Subjects
In recruiting subjects we approached students aged 10 and 11 because our results
would be comparable to other researchers and these students would have been
educated in a school that was not under the formal systems of Apartheid. When
a principal at a randomly chosen school allowed us to approach her students we
gave permission slips in the local language (Afrikaans, English or Xhosa) to the
teachers of grades four and ﬁve. We explained to the teachers and principal when
78and where the project would take place and had the students bring the permission
slips home to their parents. Parents would read a form describing the project and
then, if interested in letting their child participate, would ﬁll out the form. The
child would then return the form to her teacher. Forty students from each school
were picked to participate in the project based on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst serve basis and
their parents were notiﬁed about the time and date of the experiment. The week
the experiment was to take place reminders were sent home with the students and
the night before the experiment text messages were sent to the parents of students
who had cell phones (the vast majority of student’s parents had cell phones).
Our experiment took place on three diﬀerent days and there were 542 students
who participated: 258 students were classiﬁed as black; 175 students were classiﬁed
as coloured; 108 were classiﬁed as white; and one was classiﬁed in none of these
groups. Of the students that participated 92% were either from grades four or
ﬁve, 68% were aged 10 or 11 (93% were between the ages of 9 and 12) and 53%
were female. Tables 3.1A and 3.1B show students’ answers to questions that give
some idea of the ﬁnancial, family and neighborhood environments from where our
subjects originate. White and coloured students are much more likely to have a
parent that works, a ﬂush toilet, more rooms in their house, have a landline or live
with someone who owns a cell phone than a black student. Furthermore white
and coloureds are statistically indistinguishable across these criteria. Given that
whites and coloureds are wealthier than blacks these results are not surprising.
The only questions that proxy for wealth where whites and coloureds vary are if
their parents own a car or if their house has only one or two rooms. In both
situations coloureds are less likely to display the characteristic associated with a
79higher income; either owning a car or having a larger house. Therefore, given
that whites and coloureds are closely related in wealth, even across these crude
questions white students seem to come from a wealthier background. This shows
that the students in our sample, like the larger Cape Town population, have a
varied ﬁnancial background where blacks are the least economically advantaged
and whites the most economically advantaged.
In terms of family background, tables 3.1A and 3.1B show that whites and
coloureds are more likely than blacks to have either their mother or father living
with them and that whites and coloureds are statistically indistinguishable from
each other. In fact, of the family questions asked, whites and coloureds are only
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the languages they speak (more whites speak
Afrikaans than coloureds and more coloureds speak English than whites) and on
whether their grandfather lives with them (a higher percent of coloured students
are likely to have their grandfather live with them). Blacks are statistically sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from whites and coloured on all questions accept whether a
grandparent lives with them. This shows that in terms of family background,
whites and coloureds come from roughly the same background whereas the black
students have a diﬀerent situation.
Neighborhood questions show that across races the biggest diﬀerence is in
whether or not students think their neighborhood is safe and the racial make-
up of the neighborhood a student comes from. On average, whites think their
neighborhood is safer than either coloureds or blacks and, on average, coloureds
think their neighborhoods are safer than what blacks. Also, overwhelmingly so,
students are more likely to live in neighborhoods where most of the people are
80Sample Black White 1 Coloured 23
Mom works (if known) 71.04 62.87 79.63 *** 77.33 ***
Dad works (if known) 84.23 74.54 95.10 *** 90.18 ***
Lives with old-age pensioner (if known) 64.36 33.51 37.31 38.06
Have a flush toilet in their house 84.02 73.31 92.08 *** 94.08 ***
Parents have a car 53.88 25.42 89.81 *** 70.18 *** ***
Number of rooms in house
1 or 2 28.16 35.42 14.15 *** 26.79 ** **
3 23.88 19.58 30.19 ** 26.19
4 20.58 26.25 16.98 * 14.88 ***
5 or more 27.38 18.75 38.68 *** 32.14 ***
Have a landline in their house 53.82 33.74 74.07 *** 69.19 ***
Live with someone who owns a cell phone 88.72 82.79 97.20 *** 91.81 *** *
Mom lives with them 89.23 83.68 94.44 *** 93.60 ***
Dad lives with them 61.43 50.63 70.75 *** 70.59 ***
Parents ever fight 33.60 17.67 50.94 *** 44.12 ***
Grandmother lives with them 27.39 28.22 21.30 30.23
Grandfather lives with them 15.61 15.48 10.19 19.30 **
Language spoken at home
Afrikaans 13.31 1.53 35.85 *** 17.95 *** **
Xhosa 46.39 92.37 0.00 *** 1.28 ***
English 39.54 5.34 64.15 *** 80.77 *** **
Other 0.76 0.76 0.00 0.00
Someone in their family is sick 40.47 43.16 34.26 40.94
Felt sick recently 50.10 46.38 58.33 ** 49.71
Missed school because of sickness 35.73 36.45 45.00 48.61 **
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
Column 1 shows whether there is a significant difference between black and white students.  
Column 2 shows whether there is a significant difference between black and Coloured students.  
Column 3 shows if there is a significant difference between white and Coloured students.
Questions Proxing for Wealth and Income
Family and Health Questions
Table 3.1A
Sample shares for entire sample and by race.
81Sample Black White 1 Coloured 23
House was stolen from in last month 12.16 11.69 15.74 10.59
Neighbor's house stolen from last month (if  23.39 20.83 30.77 23.23
Neighbor's ever fight (if known) 52.38 52.10 64.44 47.57 *
Has a sick neighbor (if known) 27.53 29.53 30.23 23.40
Think neighborhood is safe 68.92 55.46 87.74 *** 75.30 *** **
Race of most of the people in neighborhood
Black 37.63 76.44 3.81 *** 6.63 ***
White 19.32 4.89 56.19 *** 15.06 *** ***
Coloured 19.52 1.33 5.71 ** 53.01 *** ***
Other 0.80 0.00 1.90 ** 1.20 *
Many different races 22.74 17.33 32.38 *** 24.10
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
Table 3.1B
Sample shares for entire sample and by race.
Column 1 shows whether there is a significant difference between black and white students.  
Column 2 shows whether there is a significant difference between black and Coloured students.  
Column 3 shows if there is a significant difference between white and Coloured students.
Neighborhood Questions
82of their own race than a racially mixed neighborhood. This speaks to the racial
segregation that is still present in Cape Town and is representative of how racially
divided the schools are in Cape Town.
3.2.3 Laboratory Setting
The experiment took place at a primary school much like the ones the students in
fourth or ﬁfth grade attend every day. The school was located in the center of the
metropolitan Cape Town area. This cut down on transportation time from each
of the participating schools to the experimental school. The school was a former
Model C, white school, but now is a coloured majority school. For the experiment
we used the school’s 14 classrooms that were organized around two courtyards.
Each of the classrooms had a blackboard, chairs, desks and tables.
On each day of the experiment ﬁve schools were chosen to participate: two black
majority schools; one coloured majority school; and two white majority schools.
This make-up of schools was chosen so that we could have the racial demographics
desired on each day. On the day that a student’s school was suppose to participate
in the experiment the student was brought to her local school by either a parent,
neighbor, sibling, friend or arrived on her own. At the local school a bus and
two supervisors arrived to check the students in. In addition to the supervisors,
black majority schools had two teachers that supervised the arrival and departure
of students. Teachers were asked to be present because most black students spoke
Xhosa. Having a teacher present allowed a person who could speak Xhosa help
facilitate the project. Once on the bus and checked in the students were told to
put their seat-belts on and were driven to the experimental school. After all ﬁve
83buses arrived at the experimental school students were divided into sessions.
With 200 students expected each day and only 14 classrooms in which to run ex-
periments we broke the students into two sessions: morning and afternoon. Morn-
ing session students participated in the experiment in the morning while the after-
noon session students watched a movie, ate lunch and relaxed. Once the morning
session was over the afternoon session students took part in the experiment and
the morning session students ate lunch and then watched a movie. At all times the
students were supervised by local high schoolers. The students were randomized
into the morning and afternoon session such that roughly half the students from
each school participated in both sessions. This was to allow us to keep the racial
make-up of the two sessions roughly equivalent.
After being broken into sessions students were led into the classroom where
they were to take part in the experiment. In the classroom a student was greeted
by a ‘facilitator.’ A facilitator was a student from the University of Cape Town
who had been trained on how to run the experiments. The facilitators were chosen
so that they roughly represented the make-up of the students: 7 were black; 5 were
white; and 2 were coloured. Also, 8 of the 14 facilitators were women. Varying
the makeup of facilitators allowed us to see what eﬀect, if any, gender or race of
the facilitator would have on the students that were being supervised by her. To
be able to test for what eﬀects a facilitator had on her students performance we
randomized what type of group each facilitator would have. That is, we decided
how many racially mixed and segregated groups were desired and then randomly
assigned them to diﬀerent facilitators so that, by the end of all three days, we
had each type of group supervised by every possible race and gender combination.
84There was one facilitator who was not included in our randomization because she
was a Xhosa speaking. Because she was able to speak Xhosa ﬂuently she was
assigned an all black group each day. We did however vary whether her group
was all-male or all-female and if it racially cued or not.7 This allowed us to cut
down on the number of Xhosa translators that were needed. Therefore, except in
one case, each student was randomly assigned to a teacher and session.
Besides facilitators students interacted with translators and supervisors through-
out the day. The supervisors simply oversaw the students when they were not in
the experiments. Translators were people speciﬁcally hired to translate what the
facilitators were saying into Xhosa in case someone did not understand English.
In many cases black students required Xhosa translators to help understand the
facilitator’s instructions and to translate questions that the student may have had.
Three translators were hired from the University of Cape Town and four transla-
tors were teachers from the black majority schools. Each translator was assigned
to assist in two classrooms. While one classroom was running one round of mazes
the translator would go to the other classroom to help the group begin another
round of mazes.
One important ﬁnal note is that we kept boys and girls segregated into diﬀerent
groups. That means each group was made up of either all boys or all girls.
This precaution was taken because of the eﬀect of gender mixing seen in other
experiments.8 Later on we will break down the eﬀects we see by gender and be
able to discuss how boys and girls react diﬀerently in each setting.
Tables 3.2A and 3.2B show sample proportions by race for the treatment and
7We discuss what it means to be cued to one’s race or not below.
8For instance see Gneezy et. al (2003).
85control groups. Tables 3.3A and 3.3B show the same information by gender.9
These tables show how well our randomization worked and what we might have to
control for in our regressions. In the overall treated and control groups there are
few diﬀerences. The main diﬀerences are due to a slightly diﬀerent distribution
of age. The three other diﬀerences are for whether a student’s parents own a car,
has a ﬂush toilet in her house or if her parents ﬁght. The ﬂush toilet question was
asked to get at the lowest wealth levels – the idea being that if a student doesn’t
have a ﬂush toilet she would be more likely to live in a very low income household.
Whether a parent has a car was asked to diﬀerentiate the higher wealth levels –
that means if a student’s parents have a car then she is would more be likely come
from a wealthier family. Therefore, in the control group, we have that, on the
margin, our students might be slightly more wealthy than the treatment group.
Before deciding how to deal with this we want to look at how the treatment and
control groups vary by race.
For coloured students, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the treated and control groups. For white students we have a slight diﬀerence in
the age distribution. These results are driven by the fact that four of the white
students claimed to be 13 years of age or older. Out of 108 observations this is
not that large of a group. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the questions
proxying for wealth among white students. The only diﬀerences for the white
students seems to be that the control group is less likely to have their grandfather
9We discuss the treatment and control framework in more detail later on but
can brieﬂy outline the technique here. Treated groups were given a questionnaire
that was designed to make their racial identity more salient. The control group was
given a questionnaire but their questions were not designed to make race salient.
Therefore the treated group were those who had a stronger racial identity.
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90live with them and less likely to have someone sick in their family. These two
questions may be picking up the same thing; if someone is more likely to have
a grandfather living with her that grandfather’s health could eﬀect whether she
knows if someone in her family is sick. The diﬀerences for black students seem
to be in regards to the size of a house and whether one has a ﬂush toilet. Since,
for both questions, the control group is likely to have a slightly more rooms in
their house and are more likely to have a ﬂush toilet then, at the bottom of the
distribution, blacks in the control group may be slightly more wealthy than the
treated students. This diﬀerence does not seem to be present for students at
the higher level of the wealth distribution. For blacks there are more diﬀerences
between the age of students than in the white or coloured groups and we will try
to control for this in the regressions.
Tables 3.3A and 3.3B show that most of the diﬀerence between the control
and treatment group may be coming through girls. Boys are almost statistically
identical. The only diﬀerences are wether they know if their neighbors ﬁght or if
their mother works: the control group is less likely to have a mother that works
and is more likely to have neighbors that ﬁght. Girls in the control group are, on
average, more likely to be slightly younger, have less siblings, have parents who
own a car and live in a house that has a ﬂush toilet. The wealth diﬀerences suggest
that girls in the control group could be slightly wealthier and this may be due to the
fact that, on average, they are more likely to have a father that works. If possible
we try to control for the age diﬀerences when analyzing how girls respond to our
treatment. Since most of the diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups
are driven by girls then we do not feel it necessary to control for the diﬀerences in
91the age distribution when dealing with boys.
3.2.4 Experimental Design
Our experiment was setup to test how consciously being reminded of one’s racial
identity – brought on through racial cuing and mixing – eﬀects the performance
level of diﬀerent racial groups. Looking at the eﬀects of racial identity has been
done before by psychologists (see Steele et. al. (2002) for an overview). We
look at the eﬀects in a clearly incentivized environment, by controlling the amount
of money that each student can receive, whereas the incentives in other studies
have been less clear, such as golﬁng proﬁciency or performance on standardized
tests. Furthermore we examine what eﬀect racial identity has on an individual’s
self-conﬁdence and perceived ranking within a group. We are also the ﬁrst to
cue students to their racial identity through both racial mixing and the use of
questionnaires.
To make a student aware or her racial identity we used a questionnaire to cue
her to her race. After the students were in a classroom the facilitator explained
that they would be doing seven rounds of mazes. In each round a student had
ﬁve minutes to complete as many mazes as possible.10 Each round involved a
diﬀerent payment scheme that was described before that round of mazes began.
After being shown an example of a maze and being allowed to solve a sample maze
students were given a questionnaire. That questionnaire was either charged or
10A student was given 10 mazes that she could solve in each round. The
mazes were of level one diﬃculty and are similar to the ones found at
http://games.yahoo.com/games/kidsmz.html. Despite the upperbound on the
number of mazes that a student could solve, of the 3794 maze packets used only
52 (≈1%) had all 10 marked.
92neutral. Neutral questionnaires had ﬁve questions that were selected not to cue a
student to her race. The charged questionnaires had ten questions; the same ﬁve
as the neutral questionnaire and ﬁve questions that cued a student to her racial
identity.11 The racial cuing questions involved a student identifying her race, the
race of her mother, the race of her father, the race of most of the students at her
school and the language she spoke at home. Identifying one’s race and discussing
race in South Africa is common so it is likely that these students have had to
answer similar questions before.
The stereotype threat literature, summarized in Steele et. al. (2002), discusses
the wide range of studies done on stereotype threat. Stereotype threat implies
that, when facing a challenging task, a person who is stereotyped as being bad at
that task faces, not only that task’s challenge, but also the stress from knowing
that people have a negative stereotype of her. In our experiment this suggests
that black and coloured students who were cued to their race should solve less
mazes than those who were not cued to their race. Furthermore, having a racially
mixed group of students (another way to visually cue a student to her race) should
make this eﬀect worse because she was ‘nearer’ to the people she believed hold
negative stereotypes of her. One could imagine, though, that black and coloured
students may ‘rally to the challenge,’ or ‘carry the ﬂag,’ in hopes disproving the
stereotypes that people have of them. Therefore we could see that blacks and
coloureds perform better when cued to their race. This idea is not supported by
11From now on we will use the term ‘charged’ and ‘racially cued via a question-
naire’ to mean the same thing. Therefore, in the following tables, the coeﬃcient for
‘charged’ shows the eﬀect of having a student cued to her racial identity through
a questionnaire.
93the stereotype threat literature however. How white students will react to the
cuing is an open question. Steel et. al. (2002) argue that people with positive
stereotypes will not be aﬀected by the cuing. Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004), show that,
with regards to caste in India, people of a higher cast (and thus supposedly thought
of positively) perform worse when students are cued their caste. Furthermore,
Ambady et. al. (2001) ﬁnd that cuing students to their race caused students to do
better if people of their racial group were stereotyped as being good at the task.12
There is less work done on how racial identity may eﬀect one’s self-conﬁdence
or perceived ranking within a group. If one is cued to her race, and her race
is perceived as worse at a certain task, than it is not a leap to suggest that a
person’s self-conﬁdence would go down. Therefore we expected that blacks and
coloureds would have lower levels of self-conﬁdence when cued to their race. Fur-
thermore, since the stereotypes of blacks were stronger and worse than coloureds
under Apartheid, we expected that blacks would react stronger to the cuing than
coloureds.
After answering the ﬁrst questionnaire the facilitator began the ﬁrst round of
mazes. In every situation the ﬁrst round of mazes a student did had the same
setup. Each student was told to solve as many mazes as she could in ﬁve minutes
and she would be paid R1 (≈$0.17) for each maze she got correct. We refer to this
treatment as the baseline. After the baseline round was ﬁnished the facilitators
conducted six more rounds of mazes, each with ﬁve minutes to do as many mazes
as possible. There were ﬁve other payment scenarios and one other baseline round.
12Both Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004), and Ambday et. al. (2001) have subjects that
are roughly the same age as ours. This means that the results from their studies
are comparable to what we are doing.
94We describe the other scenarios below. To avoid order eﬀects we randomized the
order of the six rounds after the baseline by using a random generator.
Besides being paid for each maze a student got correct she received a R5
(≈$0.83) show-up fee, lunch and snacks. On average each student took home
R38 (≈$6.33): on average blacks took home R33 (≈$5.50); coloureds took home
R38 (≈$6.33); and whites took home R43 (≈$7.17). For these students this was a
large amount of money. To see why consider employed whites. A white employed
male makes, roughly, on average, R9328 (≈$1554) a month. Assuming that there
are 21 working days in a month this means that the average daily wage of a em-
ployed white South African male is R444 (≈$74). Thus, on average, our subjects
made about 10% of the daily wage of the highest paid group in South Africa. Un-
der the same assumptions the average daily wage of a black South African male
working informally in an urban area makes R50 (≈$8.33) per day.13 These av-
erage payments are even larger considering that, by conservative measures, the
unemployment rate in South Africa was roughly 28% in March 2005.
On average blacks took home less money than whites and coloureds. This
may be due to the fact that they were less likely to have done mazes like the
ones in the experiment before. In fact only 35% of blacks said that they had
done mazes like this before but 61% of whites and 65% of coloureds had done
mazes before.14 Before running the experiment we conducted a pilot and noticed
that black students were not use to doing mazes. Therefore, we went to all the
13See Altman (2004) for the average weekly wages by race. These wages are
based on the 2002 Labour Fource Survey.
14The diﬀerence between whites and blacks is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The diﬀerence between coloureds and blacks is statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level. There is no statistical diﬀerence between white and coloured students.
95black majority schools and gave maze booklets to the students and went through
how to do mazes with the teachers that would be escorting the students on the
day of the experiment. This allowed the students who would be participating in
the experiment to practice doing the mazes and to have the directions explained
to them beforehand. This helped black students to have the same base level of
preparation at mazes as white and coloured students.
3.3 Predictions
In this section we describe four of the other payment schemes that we used in the
experiment. Besides the baseline scheme students participated in a Bet-on-oneself
(BONO), Lowest and Highest Performer (LP and HP respectively), and Feedback
round. These rounds were each designed to allow us to look at the eﬀect of racial
identity and mixing on self-conﬁdence and where one places herself in a group.
Each round involved allowing a student to complete as many mazes as possible in
ten minutes.15
3.3.1 Bet-on-oneself
In the bet-on-oneself (BONO) round a student was given a choice. Each student
could choose option one or two. Option one was just like the baseline – students
would receive R1 for each maze solved correctly. In option two the payment
that a student would receive per maze was based on performance. If a student
correctly solved three or more mazes then she would get R2 for each maze but
15To mention again, each student could only do as many as 10 mazes in the ﬁve
minutes and, for almost all students, that was plenty.
96if she solved less than three mazes correctly she would receive R0.50 per maze.16
In this treatment we can get an idea of a student’s level of self-conﬁdence. If
a student believes that she can get three or more mazes correct then she should
choose option two, if not she should choose option one. We expect that a black
or coloured student in the racially cued group will be less likely to pick option two
because she will have less self-conﬁdence than a student of the same ability in the
control group. Furthermore, if a student is in a racially mixed group, then she
will also be cued to her race. Therefore we expect black and coloured students in
a racially mixed group to also be less likely to choose option two. Note that if a
student chooses option two she has a higher incentive to solve more mazes than a
student who choose option one.
3.3.2 Lowest and Highest Performer
In lowest (highest) performer rounds students were told to solve as many mazes
as they could but that this time they would all be paid the same; that is they
would all receive R1 for each maze solved correctly by the person who solved the
least (most) number of mazes in the group. Therefore a student who believes that
she is the best student in the group should not be as incentivized to do as many
mazes as possible and we should see that student solve less mazes correctly. In
the case of highest performer it is the student who believes she is the worst in the
group who should begin to slack. This treatment therefore gives us an idea of
where the student places herself in the distribution. If a student performs worse in
16We picked three mazes as the dividing point because of the distribution of
mazes completed by students in the pilot.
97the highest performer round (compared to her scores in the baseline rounds) and
better in the lowest performer round then we know she believes she is in the lower
part of the distribution. Since we expect that racial cuing will bring down a black
and coloured student’s conﬁdence we expect that, on the margin, racially cued
black and coloured students will perform worse in the highest performer round
and better in the lowest performer round compared to their counterparts who are
not cued. We expect this result when we control for the level of performance in the
ﬁrst baseline. By that we mean that, in the highest performer round, if a student
did very well in the ﬁrst round of mazes than she will not reduce her performance
as much as somebody who did poorly in the ﬁrst round. Therefore the eﬀect of
cuing someone to their race will also be dependent on their initial ability. With
regards to racial mixing, we expect the same result as in cuing.
In the HP rounds there is the possibility for a “public good” eﬀect. Consider
seven students of equal caliber in a room who are all of the same race. If race is
the only characteristic on which to predict how one will do at solving mazes then it
is not unreasonable to assume that everyone is equally likely to complete as many
mazes. This could give a student the incentive to free-ride. Therefore, in the HP
rounds, we may be picking up a free-riding eﬀect in racially homogeneous groups.
This should not be a problem in the LP rounds.
3.3.3 Feedback
The feedback round, except in a few cases, was one of the last rounds that students
participated in. We put the feedback round last because we did not want possible
contamination between diﬀerent types of rounds. We did have some feedback
98rounds earlier than the seventh round so that we could see if it had an eﬀect or
if we were only picking up an order eﬀect. Before the feedback round began,
the facilitator calculated the average number of mazes that a student had solved
correctly and gave the student her average on a piece of paper. The idea was
that the feedback should give the student and idea of how well she was doing and
may mitigate or neutralize the eﬀect of the racial cuing. If a cued student found
out she was doing well for instance, she might feel that the racial cues are not as
informative as she might have initially believed.
3.4 Results
This section lays out the results of our experiment. Besides examining the di-
rection of the eﬀects of cuing and look at diﬀerence that occurs when we use a
continuous measure of racial mixing we also discuss colloquial evidence on time-
to-eﬀect of the treatment and session diﬀerences.
3.4.1 Baseline cuing eﬀects
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the results of charging on the performance of black and
coloured students in round one, the ﬁrst baseline treatment. There is no signiﬁcant
result of cuing a student to her race immediately after the questionnaire is given.
This suggests two things: ﬁrstly, that the eﬀects of racially cuing a student could
take time to set in; secondly, that we can use the ﬁrst round of mazes as a proxy
for a student’s underlying ability at mazes. Given that blacks were statistically
less likely to have done mazes than whites or coloureds this means that we should
99Charged -0.405 -0.405 -0.405 -0.415 -0.457 -0.576
[0.226]* [0.298] [0.263] [0.224]* [0.263]* [0.213]***
Mixed 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.154 0.221 0.034
[0.251] [0.299] [0.301] [0.252] [0.290] [0.244]
Charged*Mixed 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.535 0.629 0.669
[0.334] [0.477] [0.543] [0.335] [0.383] [0.315]**
Constant 1.97 1.97 1.97 2.012 1.883 1.726
[0.140]*** [0.140]*** [0.185]*** [0.157]*** [0.321]*** [0.144]***
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.09
[0.246] [0.234] [0.333] [0.246] [0.255] [0.237]
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator Gender
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 258 258 258 258 258 258
R-Squared 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.04 0.124 0.13
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.4
Regression results for charging on first baseline for black students
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
now have some control for this ex ante diﬀerence. While in table 3.4 blacks seem
to react somewhat negatively to charging if in a segregated group, we see that
the result is small and goes away with controls for session and facilitator. The
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of charging when we have dummy variables for race
is because, as we discuss below, males react strongly to our treatment. Please
note that these weak eﬀects are only for segregated black groups, though.
Table 3.6 shows the eﬀects of charging on black students and table 3.7 show
the same regressions for coloured students. We immediately see that when blacks
are segregated cuing them to their race causes them to do better than if they were
100Charged -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.013 0.031 -0.078
[0.364] [0.266] [0.283] [0.367] [0.452] [0.356]
Mixed 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.134 0.041 0.251
[0.297] [0.293] [0.285] [0.290] [0.299] [0.291]
Charged*Mixed 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.031 -0.043 0.087
[0.458] [0.408] [0.458] [0.449] [0.548] [0.442]
Constant 2.139 2.139 2.139 2.158 2.275 1.632
[0.211]*** [0.197]*** [0.283]*** [0.221]*** [0.605]*** [0.236]***
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01
[0.278] [0.293] [0.283] [0.277] [0.285] [0.263]
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator Gender
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 175 175 175 175 175 175
R-Squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.116 0.1
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
Table 3.5
Regression results for charging on first baseline for coloured students
101First Baseline Scor 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.776 0.706 0.729
[0.075]*** [0.067]*** [0.082]*** [0.076]*** [0.083]*** [0.082]***
Charged 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.673 0.691 0.553
[0.266]** [0.314]* [0.281]** [0.265]** [0.298]** [0.259]**
Mixed 0.348 0.348 0.348 0.331 0.318 0.303
[0.267] [0.418] [0.205] [0.270] [0.300] [0.266]
Charged*Mixed -1.063 -1.063 -1.063 -1.068 -1 -0.977
[0.370]*** [0.508]* [0.241]*** [0.370]*** [0.444]** [0.362]***
Constant 1.689 1.689 1.689 1.593 1.623 1.663
[0.224]*** [0.290]*** [0.203]*** [0.240]*** [0.439]*** [0.224]***
-0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.31 -0.42
[0.255] [0.305] [0.287] [0.256] [0.276] [0.253]
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator Gender
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 258 258 258 258 258 258
R-Squared 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.325 0.373 0.332
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.6
Regression results for charging on second baseline for black students
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
102First Baseline Score 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.679 0.643 0.533
[0.096]*** [0.090]*** [0.126]*** [0.097]*** [0.094]*** [0.098]***
Charged -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 -0.36 -0.524 -0.478
[0.470] [0.602] [0.619] [0.487] [0.591] [0.473]
Mixed -0.393 -0.393 -0.393 -0.346 -0.719 -0.174
[0.392] [0.618] [0.607] [0.408] [0.449] [0.381]
Charged*Mixed 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.224 0.407 0.332
[0.598] [0.884] [0.394] [0.614] [0.711] [0.584]
Constant 2.961 2.961 2.961 3.011 3.605 2.518
[0.342]*** [0.446]*** [0.312]*** [0.347]*** [0.595]*** [0.345]***
-0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15
[0.370] [0.549] [0.589] [0.369] [0.393] [0.345]
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator Gender
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 175 175 175 175 175 175
R-Squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.221 0.296 0.312
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
Table 3.7
Regression results for charging on second baseline for coloured students
103not cued. On the other hand, when in a mixed group, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect from cuing. This is surprising because it suggests that segregating
blacks and cuing them to their race means that they can do better. This is the
opposite of what is found in the stereotype threat literature and in from what has
been done on caste in India. Furthermore this suggests that cuing people to their
race, at least at ﬁrst glance, could only help students. Table seven shows the
same regressions on cuing for coloured students. We see that coloureds are not
eﬀected by the cuing treatment in these speciﬁcations. White students showed no
eﬀect of cuing at ﬁrst glance and were always in mixed groups so we are unable
to identify the eﬀect of charging and do not discuss the eﬀect of racial identity on
white students.
3.4.2 Continuous measure of mixing
Since our results suggest that cuing is not detrimental to a student’s performance
we break down the aﬀects using a more continuous measure, the percentage of
white students that are present in a group. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the results for
this type of measure. In table 3.8 we again see that segregating blacks and cuing
them to their race has a positive eﬀect but we are also picking up the detrimental
aﬀect of cuing that other researchers have found. As the percentage of whites in a
group increases blacks start to react more negatively to racial cuing.17 Therefore
17In the tables that use a continuous measure we used the distribution of the
racial make-up of our groups. Therefore, of the groups that were racially mixed,
5% of the groups had 14% or fewer whites in them. Likewise, 25% of the groups
had fewer than 16% white students. To get an idea of how the distribution of
whites in a group mattered we used the 5%-tile, 25%-tile, 50%-tile, 75%-tile and
the 95%-tile of the distribution. In the tables these parts of the distribution are
104First Baseline Score 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.771 0.698 0.718
[0.076]*** [0.071]*** [0.085]*** [0.077]*** [0.082]*** [0.082]***
Charged 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.505 0.599 0.394
[0.243]* [0.280] [0.311] [0.246]** [0.261]** [0.240]
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.945 1.266 0.777
[0.768] [1.145] [0.726] [0.776] [0.874] [0.778]
-2.696 -2.696 -2.696 -2.806 -3.109 -2.611
[1.025]*** [1.440]* [0.862]*** [1.034]*** [1.172]*** [1.029]**
Constant 1.737 1.737 1.737 1.618 1.633 1.697
[0.214]*** [0.270]*** [0.188]*** [0.237]*** [0.421]*** [0.213]***
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.02
[0.183] [0.191] [0.252] [0.184] [0.186] [0.182]
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.04
[0.183] [0.194] [0.247] [0.184] [0.186] [0.182]
-0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.35
[0.226] [0.281] [0.247] [0.226] [0.240] [0.227]
-0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.62 -0.64 -0.65
[0.310]** [0.417] [0.284]* [0.310]** -[1.890]* [0.312]**
-1.07 -1.07 -1.07 -1.10 -1.18 -1.10
[0.463]** [0.646] [0.383]** [0.465]** [0.520]** [0.467]**
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator Gender
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 258 258 258 258 258 258
R-Squared 0.313 0.005 0.313 0.313 0.317 0.338
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Charged*Percentage of 
whites present
Percentage of whites 
present
Total effect of charging 
at p50 whites present 
(29% of group white)
Total effect of charging 
at p75 whites present 
(40% of group white)
Total effect of charging 
at p95 whites present 
(57% of group white)
Table 3.8
Regression resutls for charging on second baseline for black students using a 
continuous measure of racial mixing
Total effect of charging 
at p5 whites present 
(14% of group white)
Total effect of charging 
at p25 whites present 
(16% of group white)
105Black Black  Males Coloured  Coloured 
First Baseline Score 0.605 0.818 0.402 0.591
[0.136]*** [0.101]*** [0.139]*** [0.132]***
Charged 0.321 0.745 0.129 -0.847
[0.348] [0.392]* [0.898] [0.459]*
Mixed 0.161 0.496 -0.654 0.387
[0.364] [0.355] [0.537] [0.587]
Charged*Mixed -0.614 -1.315 0.192 0.076
[0.522] [0.500]*** [0.984] [0.753]
Constant 1.948 1.708 2.896 3.633
[0.302]*** [0.362]*** [0.508]*** [0.435]***
-0.29 -0.57 0.32 -0.77
[0.385] [0.311]* [0.407] [0.600]
N 145 113 94 81
R-Squared 0.154 0.443 0.094 0.268
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of charging if 
mixed
Table 3.9
Regresssion results for charging by race and gender
106we have that the presence of people who are outside one’s racial group causes one
to do worse when cued to her race. This result could be the reason that we have
a diﬀerent eﬀect of charging than other research. Our experiment has been done
in a country where the majority of individuals are not white (in the western cape
the majority are not black but coloured). Therefore, unlike the United States
for instance, we have to increase the group that was originally favored (whites) to
see the eﬀects. This suggests that the eﬀects from cuing someone to their race
is not solely related to the stereotypes associated with one’s race but also with
the mixture of races present. Before exploring this more we look at table 3.9 to
see that males react more to charging than females. This is true for both blacks
and coloureds. Therefore to get a better idea of the eﬀects of charging using our
continuous variable we will only look at the boys in our sample.
Table 3.10 shows the same overall eﬀects of charging that we saw in the overall
black population but we have that charging eﬀects black boys more negatively with
even less whites present. Table 3.11 shows the eﬀects of charging for coloured
males. In the ﬁrst column we see a surprising diﬀerence between how coloureds
and blacks respond to the presence of whites. Coloureds do worse when fewer
whites are present. To check how robust this result is we look at this result
with further controls. In the other columns, while this stark diﬀerence between
blacks and coloureds is still present, we ﬁnd that its signiﬁcance is sensitive to
what controls we have. This is most likely due to the fact that we only have 81
coloured males in our sample.
Our results thus far are illuminating for many reasons. It suggests that racial
represented by p5, p10, p25, p50, p75, and p90 respectively.
107First Baseline Score 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.834 0.708
[0.102]*** [0.087]*** [0.080]*** [0.102]*** [0.123]***
Charged 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.752 0.735
[0.352]** [0.276]** [0.481] [0.406]* [0.465]
Percentage of whites present 1.311 1.311 1.311 1.265 1.315
[0.831] [0.915] [0.815] [0.822] [1.126]
-4.055 -4.055 -4.055 -4.095 -3.884
[1.198]*** [1.231]*** [1.580]** [1.241]*** [1.730]**
Constant 1.741 1.741 1.741 1.68 1.567
[0.353]*** [0.350]*** [0.325]*** [0.401]*** [0.575]***
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.18
[0.253] [0.198] [0.281] [0.291] [0.299]
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09
[0.244] [0.198] [0.252] [0.279] [0.283]
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.42 -0.37
[0.250]* [0.254] [0.168]** [0.260] [0.292]
-0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.89 -0.82
[0.321]*** [0.359]** [0.006]*** [0.315]*** [0.412]**
-1.60 -1.60 -1.60 -1.59 -1.48
[0.485]*** [0.548]** [0.482]*** [0.472]*** [0.666]**
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 113 113 113 113 113
R-Squared 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.523
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of charging at p95 
whites present (57% of group 
white)
Charged*Percentage of whites 
present
Total effect of charging at p5 
whites present (14% of group 
white)
Total effect of charging at p25 
whites present (16% of group 
white)
Total effect of charging at p50 
whites present (29% of group 
white)
Total effect of charging at p75 
whites present (40% of group 
white)
Regression resutls for charging on second baseline for black male students 
when using a continuous measure of racial mixing
Table 3.10
108First Baseline Score 0.604 0.604 0.604 0.595 0.575
[0.131]*** [0.113]*** [0.106]*** [0.133]*** [0.147]***
Charged -0.693 -0.693 -0.693 -0.503 -0.89
[0.444] [0.720] [0.727] [0.449] [0.703]
Percentage of whites present 1.646 1.646 1.646 2.474 -0.408
[1.542] [1.858] [1.921] [1.604] [2.217]
-0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -1.403 0.549
[2.091] [2.718] [2.126] [2.052] [2.667]
Constant 3.538 3.538 3.538 3.754 3.957
[0.483]*** [0.575]*** [0.372]*** [0.503]*** [0.902]***
-0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.70 -0.81
[0.375]* [0.524] [0.541] [0.374]* [0.523]
-0.74 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74 -0.80
[0.386]* [0.514] [0.521] [0.383]* [0.514]
-0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.90 -0.73
[0.512] [0.578] [0.492] [0.501]* [0.585]
-0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -1.06 -0.67
[0.699] [0.773] [0.578] [0.680] [0.779]
-0.85 -0.85 -0.85 -1.30 -0.58
[1.020] [1.164] [0.833] [0.994] [1.163]
Fixed effects for Session Facilitator
Clustered on Facilitator School
N 81 81 81 81 81
R-Squared 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.299 0.387
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of charging at p95 
whites present (57% of group 
white)
Charged*Percentage of whites 
present
Total effect of charging at p5 
whites present (14% of group 
white)
Table 3.11
Regression resutls for charging on second baseline for coloured male 
students when using a continuous measure of racial mixing
Total effect of charging at p25 
whites present (16% of group 
white)
Total effect of charging at p50 
whites present (29% of group 
white)
Total effect of charging at p75 
whites present (40% of group 
white)
109cuing can have two eﬀects on performance and, consequentially, self-conﬁdence.
If we make people aware of their race then they could do better or worse and
that the eﬀect is strongly dependent upon the situation. If we have an all black
school then, discussing race or having a discussion about race could help increase
student performances. On the other hand, in higher education in South Africa
for instance, the racial quota program used to help formerly disadvantaged groups
get into University could be having a negative eﬀect on their performance once the
students are enrolled because there is a higher percentage of whites at University
than in South Africa as a whole. Furthermore these results are not correlated
with whether or not there is a negative or positive stereotype about a group overall
because racially cuing blacks can cause them to perform better in certain situations.
3.4.3 Time-to-Eﬀect
Since students were randomized into morning and afternoon session we are able
to look at the what diﬀerences, if any, may exist in the time-to-eﬀect of racial
cuing. We present these results in table 3.12. In this table we see that black and
coloured students have a diﬀerent response to charging in both sessions. Coloureds
perform worse due to charging in a mixed group in the afternoon sessions while
blacks perform worse in the morning. Why might this be happening? After
arriving at the experimental school students remained with their classmates while
they ate or watched a movie, but students were able to see the racial make-up of
the other students who would be participating. This means that there may have
been some visual racial cuing before the afternoon session students even began to
participate in the experiment. We can gain some insight due to this unplanned
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111event. Since blacks reacted stronger to cuing in the morning that means that as
the day went on blacks became less reactive to charging. This suggests that over
time blacks might not be as reactive to racial cuing. Coloureds had the opposite
reaction. Therefore we may expect that over time coloureds react stronger to
environments in which there is racial cuing.
3.4.4 Visual cuing
Table 3.13 allows us to look at how racial cuing through questionnaires and through
visually mixing diﬀerent racial groups aﬀects students performance.18 We again
have the result that racially segregating blacks and cuing them to their race has a
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on their performance. Furthermore, though, we have
that if a black student is in a racially charged environment then throwing that
student into a mixed group is going to lower her performance. This would suggest
that rapidly integrating a school system in a racially divided city could hurt those
students who are most in need of a better education. When looking at the eﬀects
on coloureds, though, we see that there is no statistically signiﬁcant result of either
mixing or segregating them when in a neutral or charged environment.
3.4.5 Self-Conﬁdence
We have that black and coloured students are reacting much diﬀerently when their
racial identity is cued. Black students are acting as many previous studies would
suggest – when they are cued to their racial identity they perform worse. We are
18In table 3.13 the term ‘mixed’ refers to the fact that a student was in a racially
mixed group of students. Therefore the coeﬃcient on ‘mixed’ is the eﬀect that
putting a student into a racially mixed group will have.
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113getting the eﬀect that if we segregate blacks and cue them to their race they do
better, though. This could be because blacks are a majority in South Africa or
that the new political situation in South Africa is pushing blacks to overcome their
past through pride and self-conﬁdence. The results for coloured students is a bit
more disturbing. We ﬁnd that when coloured students are cued to their racial
identity they do better when they are a minority but still preform worse than if
they were not cued. These diﬀerences suggest that racial identity aﬀects both
groups diﬀerently and we feel that those diﬀerences could be explained through
self-conﬁdence.
In the bet-on-oneself (BONO) round students are given two options. Choosing
option two suggests that a student believes she is more capable of performing well
on a task than if she chose option one. Table 3.14 shows the results of charging on
black and coloured students’ choices of options in the BONO rounds. Our results
show that blacks, if segregated and cued to their race are more likely to choose
option one. This suggests they believe that they are more likely to do less than
three mazes correctly. When black students are in a mixed group they are more
likely to be self-conﬁdent (choose option two). Since blacks who are segregated
and cued to their race are likely to do better then their counter-parts who are in
a mixed group and cued to their race then this cannot be explained by suggesting
that students are realizing the eﬀect that racial cuing will have on them. We
would argue, but are unable to test, that cued students are trying to signal to
others that they are more capable then they truly are. Coloured students do not
have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect from racial cuing. Table 3.15 shows the same
regressions for the BONO option but do so only for males.
114Blacks Blacks Blacks Coloured Coloured Coloured
Charged -0.386 -0.179 -0.386 0.066 0.013 0.066
[0.090]*** [0.165] [0.068]*** [0.130] [0.081] [0.208]
Mixed -0.31 -0.153 -0.31 0.056 0.03 0.056
[0.085]*** [0.139] [0.073]*** [0.077] [0.077] [0.082]
Charged*Mixed 0.563 0.287 0.563 -0.122 -0.036 -0.122
[0.131]*** [0.210] [0.150]*** [0.145] [0.114] [0.259]
Constant 1.782 1.679 1.782 1.674 1.808 1.674
[0.133]*** [0.115]*** [0.200]*** [0.165]*** [0.063]*** [0.222]***
0.18 0.11 0.18 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06
[0.082]** [0.099] [0.094]* [0.067] [0.070] [0.073]
Clustered on Facilitator School Facilitator School
N 258 258 258 175 175 175
R-Squared 0.194 0.088 0.194 0.15 0.018 0.15
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
Table 3.14
Regression results of charging on the option chosen in the bet-on-oneself 
Considering that the BONO payment scheme is in a diﬀerent round for each
group then it could be that black students feel they are more likely to do better
in this type of round than in a baseline round – because they have more practice
for instance. Looking at table 3.16, where we do not include the choice that
the students made, we ﬁnd that blacks and coloureds in the mixed groups are
more likely to do worse when racially cued. Therefore, even if they are more
incentivized, blacks and coloureds do worse when cued despite their apparent boost
in self-conﬁdence. This leads us to ask if blacks and coloureds are overestimating
their ability or if they are trying to signal that they can perform better than
they actually do. It is important to note that the choice of option one or two
was made privately and that student’s did not see the choices made by others in
115Black Black Black Coloured Coloured Coloured
Charged -0.282 -0.029 -0.282 -0.047 0.105 -0.047
[0.194] [0.172] [0.116]** [0.206] [0.080] [0.253]
Mixed -0.097 0.03 -0.097 0.017 0.164 0.017
[0.158] [0.175] [0.077] [0.193] [0.104] [0.139]
Charged*Mixed 0.48 0.126 0.48 0.179 -0.125 0.179
[0.250]* [0.211] [0.177]** [0.222] [0.121] [0.294]
Constant 1.892 1.753 1.892 1.93 1.696 1.93
[0.160]*** [0.150]*** [0.084]*** [0.174]*** [0.054]*** [0.109]***
0.20 0.10 0.20 0.13 -0.02 0.13
[0.098]** [0.052]* [0.090]* [0.112] [0.089] [0.108]
Clustered on Facilitator School Facilitator School
N 113 113 113 81 81 81
R-Squared 0.234 0.054 0.234 0.176 0.031 0.176
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
Table 3.15
Regression results of charging on the option chosen in the bet-on-oneself 
their group. Whether the students believe that their choice is private is another
question, though.
116Black Black Black Coloured Coloured Coloured
Charged 0.864 0.471 0.864 -0.379 0.179 -0.379
[0.680] [0.305] [0.672] [1.016] [0.617] [1.246]
Mixed 1.368 1.338 1.368 0.446 1.153 0.446
[0.594]** [0.221]*** [0.692]* [1.004] [0.563]* [0.731]
Charged*Mixed -1.962 -1.486 -1.962 -0.944 -1.544 -0.944
[0.904]** [0.444]*** [0.989]* [1.267] [0.816]* [1.377]
Constant 3.048 3.37 3.048 5.945 4.433 5.945
[0.643]*** [0.264]*** [0.616]*** [1.062]*** [0.186]*** [0.832]***
-1.10 -1.01 -1.10 -1.32 -1.37 -1.32
[0.486]** [0.275]*** [0.417]** [0.761]* [0.453]** [0.638]**
Clustered on Facilitator School Facilitator School
N 113 113 113 81 81 81
R-Squared 0.135 0.078 0.135 0.234 0.072 0.234
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total effect of 
charging if mixed
Table 3.16
Regression results of charging on performance in the bet-on-oneself 
3.5 Conclusions
Using an experimental setting we are able to show how students from the greater
Cape Town metropolitan area react to having their racial identity made salient.
When black and coloured students are cued to their race they perform worse when
white students are present and, for blacks, the eﬀect gets larger as more white stu-
dents are in the present. Unlike previous studies we ﬁnd that racially segregating
groups of coloured and black students and cuing them to their race causes them to
preform better. This result could be explained through a “carrying-the-ﬂag” or
“rallying to the cause” eﬀect.19 Given that we randomized students into groups
19To “carry-the-ﬂag”means that students aimed to try and disprove the stereo-
type associated with their race. They could be aiming to do this to either them-
117based on their race and gender implies that the ordinary least squares estimation
technique that we have used is not giving us these results based on selection issues.
In regards to self-conﬁdence, black and coloured students who are cued to their
race exhibit higher levels of self-conﬁdence; they are willing bind their ﬁnancial out-
comes to their performance level. Despite this apparent increase in self-conﬁdence,
though, black and coloured students who choose to be paid based on their per-
formance actually ended up doing worse when they completed the task. This
suggests that students may be trying to signal to others that they believe they
are more capable than they actually are despite the fact that the experiment was
designed to make their choices private information. Examining what role signaling
plays when racial identity is cued is a further area of research.
The results of our experiments raise many immediate question for policy re-
search. Are diﬀerent racial groups self-selecting into jobs that they believe they
can perform well at even though they would actually do better in another envi-
ronment? Do blacks and coloureds in South Africa not internalize the eﬀects that
entering into a white majority school would have on their performance? How
does rapid desegregation eﬀect the education of those students that have negative
stereotypes associated with their race? Our research suggests that environments
that have a high level of racial tension could lead to ex ante identical groups to
have signiﬁcant ex post outcomes. Given the racial and income divides that coun-
selves or to others who may see their performance. When we mention “rallying
to the cause”we are referring to the same phenomenon but we are suggesting that
someone – that ‘someone’ could the the government, people within the students
own racial group or only a belief that students have – has argued or persuaded
people to believe they must to better to show that their racial group deserves more
credit than they are receiving.
118tries such as the United States, South Africa and India have had in their past
(perhaps some would argue that they still do) these questions are of importance
to the institutions and governments that currently implement policy within them.
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